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THE PEAHEN’S TALE, OR DRESSING OUR PARTS AT WORK 
JULIE A. SEAMAN* 
[W]hen the males and females of any animal have the same general habits of life, but 
differ in structure, colour, or ornament, such differences have been mainly caused by 
sexual selection . . . .1 
Our settled law in this circuit, however, does not support Jespersen’s position that a sex-
based difference in appearance standards alone, without any further showing of disparate 
effects, creates a prima facie case.2 
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 1. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION 137–38 
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I. INTRODUCTION: DRESSING THE PART 
Social norms regarding body modification, ornamentation, and covering 
exist in every known human society.3 And in every known human society, such 
norms include gender norms: individuals are expected to adhere to certain sex-
differentiated dress and grooming codes.4 Gender differences in dress norms, in 
other words, appear to be universal among human societies.5 
Likewise, sexual dimorphisms—differences in form between males and 
females of the same species—are a common feature of animal species. Such 
differences have been extensively studied by evolutionary biologists and are 
widely understood as adaptations caused by sexual selection. According to the 
most common understanding, males “dress up” in order to be chosen by picky 
females.6 Thus, in the most famous example, the peacock evolved his 
magnificent tail because peahens disproportionately chose to mate with fancy-
tailed males. And the peahen’s tail is plain and drab because—to put it 
bluntly—the males are sufficiently promiscuous and indiscriminate that she 
need not waste precious biological resources making and carting around such 
an otherwise useless accessory.7 
In humans, dress, broadly defined, may be viewed as in part driven by 
similar signaling purposes that are ultimately8 tied to sexual selection pressures. 
Human dress can serve to enhance, hide, minimize, distort, highlight, or reveal 
physical, mental or emotional features that are potentially relevant to others in 
the social context. Dress therefore serves various signaling and expressive 
functions9 in addition to its more mundane purposes of bodily protection and 
 
 3. See Joan Entwistle, The Dressed Body, in BODY DRESSING (DRESS, BODY, CULTURE) 33 (Joanne 
Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson eds., Berg 2001) (“Dress is a basic fact of social life and this, according 
to anthropologists, is true of all human cultures that we know about: all cultures ‘dress’ the body in 
some way, be it through clothing, tattooing, cosmetics or other forms of body painting.”). 
 4. See Joanne B. Eicher & Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins, Definition and Classification of Dress: 
Implications for Analysis of Gender Roles, in DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND MEANING 17 (Ruth 
Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher eds., Berg 1993) (“Each society, or subgroup of a society, has its own rules 
regarding which body modifications or supplements should declare gender roles; to our knowledge, 
all make their declarations.”); RUTH P. RUBINSTEIN, DRESS CODES: MEANINGS AND MESSAGES IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 103–04 (Westview Press 2d ed. 2001) (citing J. C. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CLOTHES 25–30 (International Universities Press 1966)). 
 5. Cf. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 130–41 (Temple Univ. Press 1991) (compiling a 
list of traits of behavior and language that have been noted by ethnographers to exist in every 
known human society). While “body adornment” is included in Professor Brown’s list of “human 
universals,” sex or gender distinctions in dress are not. Id. Scholars of dress, however, do view such 
distinctions as universal. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III. 
 7. For a summary of the various theories used to explain such fancy ornaments as the 
peacock’s tail, see infra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. 
 8. In evolutionary biology, ultimate cause is distinguished from proximate cause. Ultimate 
cause refers to the evolutionary reason that a particular behavior or trait was adaptive; proximate 
causes, in contrast, are the more immediate triggers that lead to the behavior or trait being expressed 
under particular circumstances. See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1128 (1997). 
 9. Though it is obvious that dress serves these functions, it is not always obvious exactly what 
it is that particular dress is meant to signal or express. Most evolutionary psychologists assume that 
many human body modifications are meant to signal (truly or falsely) those qualities that, in theory, 
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warmth.10 Furthermore, these signals are not singular; rather, they are discursive 
and multiple. For example, a business suit on a man might signal status and self-
restraint;11 wearing a business suit to court conveys a willingness to conform to 
social dress norms;12 wearing a business suit to the beach signals something 
altogether different;13 a woman in an identical men’s suit sends yet another set of 
signals entirely.14 Therefore, while the original dress feature might signal one or 
more of a number of behavioral or social characteristics,15 once that signal 
becomes embedded in the web of social dress norms, adherence to or rejection of 
the signal carries an additional set of signals that bear on traits related to social 
conformity, risk-aversion, rebelliousness, and the like.16 
 
are valued in the particular mating market. Most broadly, these are youth, fertility, and in some 
cases sexual availability or chastity in females, and wealth and status in males. See generally DAVID 
M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 19–72 (Basic Books rev. ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter BUSS, EVOLUTION OF DESIRE]; David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences: 
Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 2, 12 (1989) [hereinafter Buss, 
Sex Differences]. For a discussion of the symbolic meanings of various modes of dress, see generally 
RUBINSTEIN supra note 4. 
 10. Scholars have posited three theories for the origin of clothing: the modesty theory, the 
protection theory, and the adornment theory. See BUSS, EVOLUTION OF DESIRE supra note 9, at 20–33. 
Ethnographic research suggests that protection is unlikely to have been the original purpose of 
clothing because there exist societies in harsh climates where persons do not wear nor appear to 
need any bodily covering. However, once clothing is worn, the natural body defenses diminish and 
people become dependent on the clothing. See id. at 22–24. However, even in those societies devoid 
of clothing, the people wear some form of ornamentation or alter their bodies in some way. See id. at 
20 (“while there are many societies in which the people are unclothed, there are no societies in which 
the people are unadorned”). 
 11. The classic male suit minimizes bodily features and thus seems the opposite of the peacock’s 
tail. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 86–88 (“The male suit in its form-following style denied the 
body; in its somber color it repudiated public expression of feelings.”). 
 12. Cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding judge’s policy 
requiring male attorneys to wear ties in the courtroom because policy appropriately sought to 
maintain decorum); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 222 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that an 
employee’s violation of the haircut policy was a legitimate basis for her firing, even after she took 
steps to comply with the policy, because “violating the rule [was] a form of insubordination”). 
 13. See ALISON LURIE, THE LANGUAGE OF CLOTHES 13 (Random House 1981) (“[T]he two-piece 
tan business suit and boldly striped shirt and tie that signify energy and determination in the office 
will have quite another resonance at a funeral or picnic.”). 
 14. See MALCOLM BARNARD, FASHION AS COMMUNICATION 171 (Routledge 1996) (“Non-verbal 
signs such as items of fashion and clothing, like linguistic signs, then, take their meanings from the 
context, or syntagm, in which they appear.”). 
 15. For example, in the Laboya culture of eastern Indonesia, adult individuals always carry a 
purse that contains ingredients for chewing betel, a plant that is integral to their social relationships. 
This betel purse reveals, at a glance, its owner’s sex, marital status, age, and social status. See 
Danielle C. Geirnaert, Purse-Proud: Of Betel and Areca Nut Bags in Laboya (West Sumba, Eastern 
Indonesia), in DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND MEANING 56–70 (Ruth Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher 
eds., Berg 1992). 
 16. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3 (“Most social scientists . . . recognize that a person’s attire 
can indicate either conformity or resistance to socially defined expectations for behavior.”); see also 
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (noting that the 
employer “believed that the entire business community it served—and depended upon for business 
success—associated long hair on men with the counter-culture types”). Joan Roughgarden, an 
evolutionary biologist at Stanford, has recently argued that male animal ornamentation similarly 
might have evolved to serve a “social inclusionary” function rather than through sexual selection. 
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Though social norms regarding sex differences in dress have lost much of 
their force in recent years as so-called “unisex” fashions and gender cross-over 
in certain styles of dress have become fairly common, there still exist a number 
of dress conventions that are identifiably “male” and “female” in American 
culture. Thus, for example, skirts and dresses continue to be strongly coded as 
female,17 whereas ties are strongly coded as male.18 When such sex-specific social 
conventions are not only performed in the workplace but are actually mandated 
by employers, difficult doctrinal and normative issues arise. 
Courts have for years addressed challenges to employer dress codes that 
differentiate between men and women in conformance with widely-accepted 
social dress norms.19 The outcomes of these cases, along with their reasoning and 
analysis, are increasingly difficult to reconcile across the spectrum of situations 
in which the issue arises. In rationalizing their holdings, courts have engaged in 
analytic contortionism of the highest degree. However, there may ultimately be 
no logical way to reconcile decisions that prohibit employers from requiring 
women to wear revealing outfits and others that permit employers to require 
them to wear makeup,20 or decisions that prohibit penalizing a woman for being 
insufficiently feminine and others that permit penalizing a man for being 
insufficiently masculine.21 In addition, the increasing judicial acceptance of the 
sex stereotyping theory of sex discrimination under Title VII is in substantial 
tension with recent cases that insist that sex-differentiated dress and grooming 
 
See JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, EVOLUTION’S RAINBOW: DIVERSITY, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN NATURE 
AND PEOPLE 175–81 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2004). 
 17. This particular item of dress appears to be very stubbornly resistant to attempts to broaden 
its appeal to men. Some avant-garde fashion designers, most notably Jean-Paul Gaultier, have 
repeatedly tried to market dresses and skirts for men with very minimal success. See DIANA CRANE, 
FASHION AND ITS SOCIAL AGENDAS: CLASS, GENDER, AND IDENTITY IN CLOTHING 195, 201 n.21 (The 
University of Chicago Press 2000); BARNARD, supra note 14, at 112. 
 18. See, e.g., RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 51–52 (“An essential element of male dress that is 
symbolic of holding in one’s feelings is the necktie or cloth”); see also Susan Kaiser, Minding 
Appearances: Style, Truth, and Subjectivity, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 88 (assuming that ties 
are strongly coded male by relating the story of “a feminist professor [who] describes how she wears 
‘pervertized ties’ with many of her outfits to undermine dominant masculinity”). 
 19. These cases arise primarily under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (2000), which generally prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace, but they also may be 
brought under state anti-discrimination statutes and, in the case of public employees, § 1983 and the 
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 795 P.2d 602 (Ore. Ct. App. 
1990); Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 20. Compare, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding 
defendant employer’s policy requiring female lobby attendants to wear a sexually provocative 
uniform violated Title VII) with Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (holding that defendant employer’s policy requiring only female bartenders to wear makeup 
did not violate Title VII). 
 21. Compare, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with Smith v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and 
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) 
(arguing that, despite the fact that the cases squarely considering the issue of discrimination against 
effeminate males were decided pre-Price Waterhouse, it remains doubtful whether an effeminate 
man in the typical case would prevail in a Title VII challenge to discrimination against him on the 
basis of his effeminate behavior). 
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requirements that “merely”22 conform to existing social gender norms do not 
amount to impermissible sex discrimination. 
Most courts and scholars who have addressed this tension have attempted 
to draw lines such that some sex distinctions in dress requirements survive legal 
scrutiny while others fail. These approaches highlight various aspects of sex-
differentiated dress rules that are seen as especially relevant or problematic. 
Whether the focus is upon subordination, power differentials, autonomy, 
freedom of expression, mutability, or the simple unfairness of being placed in an 
impossible Catch-22,23 these various approaches bring into sharp relief the 
existence of the many strands that have become entangled in the employee dress 
cases. 
This article proposes an analysis of employer dress codes that draws its 
inspiration from an examination of the reasons for sex distinctions in “dress” 
among nonhuman animals. Part II describes the contradictions inherent in the 
various lines of dress and grooming cases. This part teases apart the various 
doctrinal and theoretical strands to show that there are several separate 
elements in play, sometimes operating at cross-purposes. Part III explains the 
theory of sexual selection, which accounts for the striking dimorphisms in 
coloration, feathers, weaponry, and ornamentation among nonhuman animals. 
As this discussion reveals, there is a strong element of female choice and female 
power that is directly correlated with the type and extent of sexual dimorphisms 
in animals. 
Part IV draws upon insights from the study of animal dress, along with the 
anti-caste view of Title VII, to propose a partial solution to the problem 
presented by the Title VII dress cases. Drawing a line that could be applied 
easily by courts, this Part proposes that any employer policy that requires 
females to be more highly decorated than males—including policies that require 
women to wear makeup or to wear clothes that reveal more of their bodies than 
the corresponding male dress requirement24—should be deemed to run afoul of 
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of sex. It further argues that the 
analogy to animal dress implies that there is no such thing as a sex-specific dress 
code that is de minimus25 or that equally burdens males and females.26 
 
 22. I place this word in quotation marks to emphasize that it is the courts, and not I, who find 
objections to these employer sex distinctions trivial. See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 
F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (characterizing male plaintiff’s claim that defendant-employer’s hair-length 
policy violated Title VII because it prohibited long hair for men but not women as an argument that 
“Title VII applies to any employment policy with any difference between men and women, no 
matter how trivial”). As I argue in Part IV.A, infra, sex differences in dress are far from trivial. 
 23. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women 
but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out 
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”). 
 24. In determining which items of dress fall under this rubric, I draw on both sexual selection 
and sociological accounts of dress and gender. See discussion infra Parts III and VI. 
 25. Many courts state that dress and grooming requirements are trivial or de minimus under 
Title VII. See, e.g., Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908; Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 
1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Pacenka v. Fareway Stores, 
Inc., 672 N.W. 2d 800, 804 (Iowa 2003). 
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By offering sexual selection theory as a lens through which to examine 
dress codes in the workplace, I do not mean to suggest that it answers every 
question nor that it provides normative answers27 simply based on analogy to 
evolutionary explanations of ornamentation and sexual dimorphism. I do not 
argue, for example, that because there exist sexual dimorphisms in dress in 
nonhuman animals, that such differences are “natural” and therefore acceptable 
or desirable.28 Nor do I wish to suggest that, because there may be some 
biological or evolutionary basis for sexual dimorphisms in human social dress 
norms, that employee grooming choices should for that reason be granted 
greater protection under Title VII.29 However, an evolutionary perspective that 
 
 26. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (articulating 
“unequal burdens” test); Bedker v. Domino’s Pizza, 195 Mich. App. 725, 729 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(applying unequal burdens test); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 27. Clearly, a biological, genetic, or evolutionary explanation of human behavior cannot by 
itself answer prescriptive questions about the desirability or moral status of the behavior. Though 
the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” has resulted in much heat, most scholars who draw on 
evolutionary theory in legal analysis are careful to distinguish description from prescription. See, 
e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex 
Differences, 38 SW. L.J. 617, 654 (1984) (“A recognition that certain behavioral sex differences have 
their origins in biology does not in any way answer the question of whether the differences are good 
and to be fostered by society, or bad and to be suppressed.”); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in 
the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 451–52 (2003); Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)Function in 
Sexual Harassment Law: Biology, Culture, and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 361 (2005). 
As John Stuart Mill so astutely put it in criticizing the tendency to deduce moral “ought” from 
natural “is”: “nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild 
beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them 
with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, 
and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve.” 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 
385 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969), quoted in ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY 
WE ARE 331 (Pantheon 1994). 
 28. Indeed, the comparison to nonhuman animals is at best analogical or perhaps even 
metaphorical, since most nonhuman animal “dress” is biological and therefore not under the 
animal’s behavioral control, whereas human dress is by definition something that we humans add to 
or deliberately change on our biological bodies. With respect to nonhuman animals, this distinction 
breaks down at the margins. Some species do in fact exhibit behaviors that alter their “dress,” 
broadly defined. For example, bower birds in Australia build and decorate elaborate structures, 
called bowers, which females inspect before choosing a male with which to mate. The satin bower 
bird, “decorates his display court with blue, yellow and white objects including feathers, flowers, 
leaves, snail shells, and, where available, plastic and paper, over a background of yellow straw.” 
Gerald Borgia, Why Do Bower Birds Build Bowers?, 83 AMER. SCIENTIST 542, 544 (1995). When a female 
chooses to enter the bower, the male puts on an elaborate mating display, which culminates in his 
“puff[ing] up his feathers, hold[ing] his wings at his side, fac[ing] the female with a small 
decoration—usually a yellow leaf—in his mouth and perform[ing] a series of knee bends.” Id. In this 
example, the male bower bird is in a sense decorating and enhancing his immediate physical 
environment so as to appear more attractive to females. The existence of this and other examples of 
courting behaviors that encompass decorative displays perhaps demonstrates the artificiality of the 
distinction between biology on the one hand and environment, behavior, and culture on the other. 
Cf. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets 
Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1168 (2001) (“Arguing about whether or not a given 
behavior is the product of genes or culture is (as is often noted) like arguing about whether the area 
of a rectangle is the product of its length or its width.”). 
 29. This factor lies at the heart of one of the primary rationales by which courts have rejected 
sex (and race) discrimination challenges to employer grooming requirements. Because dress is under 
the individual’s control and is viewed as a matter of choice, courts tend to distinguish discrimination 
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considers the ultimate reasons30 for sex differences in dress does help to 
distinguish those dress codes that should be permitted from those that should 
not, given the normative goals as derived from the statutory language and 
 
based on dress from discrimination based on such immutable characteristics as race and sex. Several 
courts have articulated a test by which such requirements are permissible unless they target either 
an immutable trait or a constitutionally protected fundamental right. See Harper v. Blockbuster 
Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (hairstyle is not an immutable characteristic); Earwood 
v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 
1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (hair length is neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Wiseley v. Harrah’s 
Entm’t, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14963 (D.N.J. August 4, 2004) (hairstyle not immutable 
characteristic); Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Ore. 2001) (beards 
not immutable nor fundamental right); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. 
Ind. 1998) (hairstyle is not an immutable characteristic); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (prohibition on all-braided hairstyles does not target immutable characteristic or 
fundamental right); EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 34 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16105 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 
1980) (holding that weight is neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. 
Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 1979 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7890 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1979) (holding that weight is neither immutable nor a fundamental 
right); Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Tex. 1975); McConnell v. 
Mercantile Nat’l Bank at Dallas, 389 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Jahns v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. 
Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003) (ear stud 
neither immutable characteristic nor fundamental right); Pik-Kwic Stores, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 170 Conn. 327 (1976); Planchet v. N.H. Hosp., 115 N.H. 361 (1965); Ind. Civil 
Rights Comm’n v. Sutherland Lumber, 182 Ind. App. 133 (1979); Albertson’s v. Human Rights 
Comm’n, 14 Wash. App. 697 (1976); Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human 
Rights, 50 A.D. 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
 Notions of mutability might also account for the increasing tendency of courts to recognize 
discrimination against transgendered persons—those for whom there is a disjunction between 
sexual identity and the sexual organs with which they were born—as sex discrimination. See, e.g., 
Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 
(D.D.C. 2006); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., 97 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960 (W.D. Pa. 
2006). Transsexualism is specifically excluded as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1). E.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) (dismissing transsexual’s ADA claim on this ground). Nonetheless, some courts do seem 
influenced by a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) and by the implication that experienced 
gender identity is not under the free control of the plaintiff. Though they do not specifically mention 
mutability, such attention to the medicalized nature of transgenderism probably springs from a 
similar impulse to protect plaintiffs against discrimination for traits they cannot control or change. 
See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff “began ‘expressing a more 
feminine appearance on a full-time basis’—including at work—in accordance with international 
medical protocols for treating GID”); Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (noting that the plaintiff was 
diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and describing in detail the standards for treatment of the 
condition formulated by the leading organization for the study and treatment of gender dysphoria). 
 30. As noted supra at note 8, ultimate causation in biology has a specific meaning that is 
distinguished from proximate cause: “Proximate causes involve physiology and biochemistry as 
well as an organism’s unique developmental history. Ultimate causes involve the history and 
reproductive consequences of behavior, viewed in evolutionary time.” Owen D. Jones, Law and the 
Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 174 (2000). Professor Jones 
uses the example of a male bird’s singing in spring: proximate causes “include the hormonal 
changes triggered by the lengthening of successive days, the activation of particular motor neurons 
to the vocal apparatus, and each bird’s individual experience of songs heard and songs practiced.” 
Ultimate causes, in contrast, “address the ‘purposes’ of singing—claiming territory, advertising 
genetic fitness, and attracting mates—all of which contribute to reproductive success and have thus 
been favored by natural and sexual selection.” Id. 
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history or from other policy considerations.31 By looking more deeply at why 
males and females—nonhuman and human alike—dress their parts, it may be 
possible to unravel the doctrinal strands and to begin to weave a more coherent 
and suitable legal fabric.32 
II. WHO WEARS THE PANTS: SEX-SPECIFIC DRESS RULES IN THE WORKPLACE 
As one might expect given the pervasiveness of social norms that 
differentiate appropriate female from male dress,33 the workplace is no exception 
to gendered expectations regarding dress. Whether explicitly stated or as part of 
the background fabric that governs who is deemed to “fit in,” whether 
embodied in formal written policies or informal understanding and practice, 
sex-specific norms governing what individuals may or must wear exist in many 
workplaces.34 Courts have addressed such sex-differentiated35 dress 
 
 31. Evolutionary analysis itself cannot supply a normative or policy goal; rather, the usual 
method of applying evolutionary insights to legal questions “looks to norms or policies supplied 
from an outside source (the legislature, for example), and then examines evolutionary explanations 
of behavior in order to explore their potential usefulness in shaping such behavior to further the 
given goal.” Seaman, supra note 27, at 364. An alternative method, which I also employ here, is to 
look to evolutionary explanations of behavioral patterns in order to reveal the salience of certain 
traits or the relative power dynamics that underlie particular behaviors. For a comprehensive 
discussion of the possible uses of evolutionary analysis in law, see Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. 
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). 
 32. Clothing metaphors and idioms are very common in the English language (and, likely, in 
most other languages as well). Several of these idioms suggest themes of clothing as concealment, 
for example: a wolf in sheep’s clothing; an iron fist in a velvet glove; to draw a veil over something. 
Many more, however, suggest “clothing as behavior,” for example: a feather in one’s cap; at the drop 
of a hat; by the seat of one’s pants; off the cuff. See ROSAMUND MOON, FIXED EXPRESSIONS AND IDIOMS 
IN ENGLISH: A CORPUS-BASED APPROACH 204–05 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 1998). Though not 
specifically noted by Moon, other clothing metaphors imply power and submission: who wears the 
pants; lick someone’s boots; too big for one’s britches. 
 33. In all known societies, human dress has clear gender associations and is sexually dimorphic 
in some way. See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 17, at 16 (asserting that, although clothing fashions also 
communicate messages about class and social power, “their principal messages are about the ways 
in which women and men perceive their gender roles or are expected to perceive them”); MALCOLM 
BARNARD, FASHION AS COMMUNICATION 112 (Routledge 1st ed. 1996) (noting that while sex 
differences in dress are virtually universal, they vary widely in the particulars of what denotes 
masculinity and femininity in dress). 
 34. Dean Bartlett has pointed out that “[d]ress and appearance expectations are pervasive and 
persist even in the absence of mandatory codes.” Thus, she argues that “eliminating dress and 
appearance discrimination . . . in the workplace is not as simple a matter as the critics [of judicial 
rationales for upholding sex-based dress codes] suggest.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear 
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2541, 2545–51 (1994). 
 35. Throughout this article, I refer to employer policies that apply differently depending upon 
the sex of the employee as “sex-specific” or “sex-differentiated” appearance codes. I use the word 
“sex” rather than “gender” in this context because the employer has chosen to tie the appearance 
standard to the biological sex of the employee rather than to his or her gender identity, which may in 
some cases diverge from biological or chromosomal sex. See, e.g., JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. 
EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION OF DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY 
FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1973) (originating the distinction 
between sex and gender, and distinguishing between anatomical, chromosomal, and hormonal sex 
on the one hand, and psychological gender identity on the other); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING 
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requirements in a growing body of case law in which plaintiffs have challenged 
such rules as unlawful sex discrimination.36 Though both the EEOC and the 
courts in the early cases often viewed facially sex-differentiated appearance 
codes as violative of Title VII, this formal equality framework soon gave way to 
the view that it was perfectly appropriate—and legal—for an employer to 
instantiate social dress and appearance norms even where these differed 
according to sex. Throughout its development, this line of case law has 
struggled to fit within the larger doctrinal framework; however, the fit has often 
seemed more akin to that of an ill-suited hand-me-down than a tailor made 
garment. Recent sex-stereotyping cases reveal that the existing framework is in 
danger of splitting at the seams. 
In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld an employer-mandated appearance code 
that required female bartenders to wear foundation, blush, and lipstick to work, 
and to tease or style their hair every day, while prohibiting male bartenders 
from doing so.37 It is probably fair to say that this ruling, as with the prior 
decisions in the case by the district court38 and the appellate panel,39 came as 
something of a surprise40 to many scholars. It is worth asking why this would be 
so. The legal rules that the court applied were unremarkable in the sense that 
they have been established doctrine for some time.41 And yet the application of 
 
THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3–5 (Basic Books New ed. 2000) 
(discussing the sex/gender dichotomy). In discussing male-female differences in nonhuman 
animals, I also use the word “sex” rather than “gender” inasmuch as most discussions of sex 
dimorphisms in animals do not recognize the sort of cultural and social gender components as are 
well-established in the literature on human gender identity. See ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 16, at 23 
(“To a biologist, ‘male means making small gametes, and ‘female’ means making large gametes. Period! . . . 
Beyond gamete size, biologists don’t recognize any other universal difference between male and 
female.”) (emphasis in original). Roughgarden goes on to argue that there is a diversity of gender 
expression among animals. See id. at 30–105. Though I view the distinction between sex and gender 
as a useful heuristic and as a powerful critical tool, as a descriptive matter both the sex/gender 
divide and the animal/human divide are less clear at the edges than is usually imagined. 
 36. Note that some of these cases arise under the Constitution or state or local 
antidiscrimination legislation, but the analysis is generally the same as that under Title VII. See, e.g., 
Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights., 50 A.D.2d 83 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1975) (in case brought under New York Human Rights Law, court looks to federal case law to 
interpret analogous provisions of state antidiscrimination law); E. Hartford Educ. Assoc. v. Bd. of 
Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977) (where plaintiff challenged dress code under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, court held that the plaintiff’s right to dress as he pleased was not 
fundamental). 
 37. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 38. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002). 
 39. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1976 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 40. Or, if surprise is too strong a word, at least it seems that many considered the result 
sufficiently remarkable that it merited extended discussion, including the Symposium of which this 
Article is a part. 
 41. The “unequal burdens” standard, which the court applied, is well-established in the Ninth 
Circuit as a primary test for sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes. See Gerdom v. Cont’l 
Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1982). Under this standard, such employer rules, though they 
explicitly apply differently to men and women, do not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII 
unless they impose “unequal burdens” on one or the other sex. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (applying 
“settled law in this circuit” that “[a]n appearance standard that imposes different but essentially 
equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment” under Title VII) (quoting Frank v. 
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these settled rules to the case of Darlene Jespersen, a longstanding and highly 
regarded employee42 who was fired for refusing to wear makeup to work, 
sparked a flurry of commentary in the legal literature.43 
Why should the outcome of this case have generated such widespread 
comment and consternation? One reason is that the “unequal burdens” test used 
by the court was first articulated44 prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which recognized that sex stereotyping 
could constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.45 As the sex stereotyping 
 
United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000)). Though not explicitly applying the unequal 
burdens test, other circuits had applied a similar standard to sex-differentiated appearance rules 
prior to Gerdom. See, e.g., Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (reasoning that 
because grooming requirements were imposed on both male and female employees, the sexes were 
treated equally and there was no violation of Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 
F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that slight differences in grooming standards for male and female 
employees do not violate Title VII when those grooming standards are applied to all employees in 
and evenhanded manner). 
 42. The majority noted that “Darlene Jespersen worked successfully as a bartender at Harrah’s 
for twenty years and compiled what by all accounts was an exemplary record.” Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 
1107. 
 43. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L. J. 240 
(2004); Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation 
as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006); William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of 
the Ninth Circuit’s Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards under 
Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1357 (2006); Megan Kelly, Note, Making-Up Conditions of Employment: The 
Unequal Burdens Test as a Flawed Mode of Analysis in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 45 (2006); Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity 
Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90 (2006); Hillary J. Bouchard, Casenote, Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co.: Employer Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 
203 (2006); Recent Cases, Title VII—Sex Discrimination—Ninth Circuit Holds that Women Can Be Required 
to Wear Makeup as a Condition of Employment—Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th 
Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2429 (2005). For an enlightening examination of the facts, procedural 
history, and legal and social context of the Jespersen case, see Devon W. Carbado, G. Mitu Gulati & 
Gowri Ramachandran, Makeup and Women at Work, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
 44. The unequal burdens test, under which grooming or appearance rules that explicitly differ 
based on sex are nonetheless permissible so long as the grooming requirements as a whole are 
equally burdensome to both men and women, was first announced in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 
692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982). In Gerdom, the court struck down weight requirements for female flight 
attendants but distinguished earlier cases that had upheld such limits by emphasizing that in those 
cases “unlike this case, no significantly greater burden of compliance was imposed on either sex; that 
is the key consideration.” Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 606. See also Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 
753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming employer’s right to change the dress code for either sex in order to 
prevent it from becoming “overly burdensome” to either sex); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, 366 F. Supp. 
763 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated and remanded in part and aff’d in part, 567 F.2d 429 (1976) (holding that 
airline policy prohibiting female, but not male, flight attendants from wearing eyeglasses was a 
violation of Title VII, and reasoning that the rule forced female flight attendants to wear contact 
lenses, which “are substantially more expensive than eyeglasses with lenses of comparative 
quality.”). EEOC guidelines in effect prior to the Price Waterhouse decision adopted the unequal 
burdens theory of discrimination in the context of sex-differentiated grooming codes. See EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 619.4 (1981) (“So long as 
[dress code] requirements are suitable and are equally enforced and so long as the requirements are 
equivalent for men and women with respect to the standard or burden that they impose, there is no 
violation of Title VII.”). 
 45. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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theory of sex discrimination has gained greater judicial acceptance,46 it has 
begun to push at the edges of the foundational rationales that ground the dress 
and grooming cases.47 However, other cases, including some in the Ninth 
Circuit, have continued to apply the unequal burdens standard to employee 
appearance codes well after Price Waterhouse.48 Thus, the mere fact that the 
Jespersen court continued to apply this test to a sex-differentiated grooming rule 
seems insufficient reason for the case to have generated the type and degree of 
notice that it has. 
The presumption behind the unequal burdens test is that different 
treatment of men and women is not per se actionable. In essence, it is the 
“separate but equal” standard imported into the law of sex discrimination.49 A 
 
 46. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit held that a male-to-female (MTF) transsexual firefighter whose co-
workers told him he was not sufficiently masculine and who was subsequently suspended had 
sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and sex discrimination under Title VII and Price 
Waterhouse. See Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Barnes v. City of 
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Dawson, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (implicitly approving sex 
stereotyping theory of sex discrimination in case of masculine woman); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 
F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that discrimination against a homosexual based on a sex 
stereotyping theory might be actionable because it “would not bootstrap protection for sexual 
orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not all 
heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine”). District courts have also held that penalizing 
transsexual individuals for dress and grooming that crosses societal gender boundaries may 
constitute sex discrimination under Price Waterhouse. See Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10824 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2006) (following Price Waterhouse and finding sexual 
stereotyping could be a basis for a Title VII sexual discrimination claim). Other courts have found 
that impermissible sex stereotyping existed in non-dress contexts. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that school psychologist could 
state a claim under Title VII where she alleged that she was not promoted because her supervisors 
believed that women with young children could not both be a good mother and a committed 
worker, exhibiting an impermissible sex-stereotype). 
 47. The essence of the sex stereotyping theory of sex discrimination is that an employment 
decision may not be premised upon an employee’s failure to “match the stereotype associated with 
[her] group.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse to mean that “an employer who discriminates against women because, 
for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.” Smith, 378 F.3d at 574. In similar fashion, 
taking the theory of sex stereotyping discrimination to its logical conclusion would also seriously 
undermine the argument that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination. See Vickers 
v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Ultimately, recognition of Vickers’ claim 
would have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orientation discrimination. 
In all likelihood, any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex 
stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to 
conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”). 
 48. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A sex-differentiated 
appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women is disparate treatment that 
must be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification”); see also Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. 
Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006); Bedker v. Domino’s Pizza, 195 Mich. App. 725, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1992); Bridges v. Carrols Corp., 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43694 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Note that recent 
editions of the EEOC’s guidelines, issued post-Price Waterhouse, have also continued to use this 
standard. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 619.4 (1998). 
 49. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Indeed, the rhetoric of the grooming code cases 
eerily mirrors Plessy. For example, Justice Brown in Plessy stated that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color . . . .” Id. at 544. Compare the 
D.C. Circuit’s view of Congress’s intent in Title VII: “Title VII was never intended to encompass 
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comparison of the language in Jespersen to earlier decisions makes clear the 
essential continuity of judicial rhetoric and doctrine from the pre-Price 
Waterhouse cases, through the post-Price Waterhouse cases, and to the Jespersen 
case itself. In 1975, considering one of the several hair length cases in which 
male plaintiffs challenged employer policies that required male employees to 
wear short hair but allowed female employees to wear their hair long, the 
Eighth Circuit stated that: 
Defendant’s hair length requirement for male employees is part of a 
comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all employees. While no 
hair length restriction is applicable to females, all employees must conform to 
certain standards of dress. Where, as here, such policies are reasonable and are 
imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees, slight differences in the 
appearance requirements for males and females have only a negligible effect on 
employment opportunities.50 
A decade after the Supreme Court held that Ann Hopkins had suffered sex 
discrimination when her employer penalized her for failing to conform to 
socially entrenched gender stereotypes,51 the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]n 
appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on 
men and women is not disparate treatment.”52 In Jespersen, the court simply 
reaffirmed this standard, stating that “companies may differentiate between 
men and women in appearance and grooming policies” unless the policy in 
question “creates an ‘unequal burden’ for the plaintiff’s gender.”53 
Perhaps, then, it was the application of the test, rather than the test itself, 
that was somewhat unanticipated. In Jespersen, the court refused to take judicial 
 
sexual classifications having only an insignificant effect on employment opportunities.” Dodge v. 
Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Plessy, the Court focused on what it viewed 
as the reasonableness of the railroad’s regulation, and it provided, in contrast, examples (drawn 
from Plessy’s arguments) of rules that would be patently unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional: “requir[ing] separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, 
or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to 
walk upon one side of the street, and white people on the other, or requiring white men’s houses to 
be painted white, and colored men’s black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different 
colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle of 
one color is as good as one of another color.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549–50. Likewise, courts in the 
grooming cases have fallen back upon the notion of reasonableness to explain why employers may 
enact rules that treat men and women differently on their face: “We may take judicial notice that 
reasonable regulations prescribing good grooming standards are not at all uncommon in the 
business world, indeed, taking account of basic differences in male and female physiques and 
common differences in customary dress of male and female employees, it is not usually thought that 
there is unlawful discrimination ‘because of sex.’” Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 
1117 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 50. Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that minor differences 
in appearance regulations that “reflect customary modes of grooming do not constitute sex 
discrimination within the meaning of § 2000(e).”). 
 51. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (holding that, once a plaintiff has shown that gender was a 
motivating factor in the employment decision, the employer could avoid liability only if it showed, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decision would have been the same regardless of 
gender). 
 52. Frank, 216 F.3d at 854. 
 53. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating. Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
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notice of the asserted fact that a rule requiring women to wear substantial 
amounts of makeup and to tease or style their hair was more burdensome than a 
corresponding rule requiring men to wear no makeup and to keep their hair cut 
short.54 In dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that the plaintiff had raised a triable 
issue of fact on the issue of unequal burdens because, among other reasons, 
“Harrah’s policy requires women to apply face powder, blush, mascara, and 
lipstick,” and “[y]ou don’t need an expert witness to figure out that such items 
don’t grow on trees.”55 It may be that a makeup requirement such as that at issue 
in Jespersen seemed, as it did to Judge Kozinski and the other dissenters, so 
patently burdensome that the court’s refusal to notice the burden came as a 
surprise. 
Or it may be that it was not the obvious nature of the unequal burden, but 
the obviousness of the sex stereotyping that underlay the makeup policy that 
gave those watching the case pause. The Jespersen majority held that a sex-
differentiated grooming policy could constitute sex discrimination in either of 
two ways: (1) if it unequally burdened men and women, or (2) if it reflected and 
enforced an impermissible sex stereotype. Thus, while the court recognized that 
the sex stereotyping theory of sex discrimination might apply to invalidate a 
workplace dress code,56 it held that the theory did not apply to invalidate the 
Harrah’s code at issue in Jespersen.57 
The Jespersen court thus rested this part of its holding upon an asserted 
distinction between dress codes that reflect socially accepted gender appearance 
norms, which it found unproblematic, and those based upon impermissible sex 
stereotypes, which might violate Title VII. The difference between a gender 
norm on the one hand and an impermissible stereotype on the other was only 
imprecisely defined in Jespersen, but the court did offer some clues as to what 
sorts of sex-differentiated appearance codes would raise sex stereotyping 
issues.58 These clues are significant because they are representative of the threads 
of analysis that run through the appearance code cases in general and that 
comprise the forms upon which the patterns of rhetoric in these cases have been 
sewn. And these themes, it turns out, raise some intriguing analogies to the 
animal “dress” literature. 
 
 54. The court stated: “Jespersen asks us to take judicial notice of the fact that it costs more 
money and takes more time for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it takes for a 
man to comply with the requirement that he keep his hair short, but these are not matters 
appropriate for judicial notice.” Id. 
 55. See Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski also argued that it undeniably takes 
substantial time and effort to apply make-up, as even non-makeup wearers know based on “the 
hundreds of hours we’ve spent over the years frantically tapping our toes and pointing to our 
wrists.” Id. Finally, Judge Kozinksi recognized that, wholly irrespective of time, effort, or money, 
there is a non-trivial dignitary and privacy burden in forcing a person who strongly objects either to 
wear makeup or quit her job. See id. at 1117–18. 
 56. See Id. at 1113 (majority opinion) (“We emphasize that we do not preclude, as a matter of 
law, a claim of sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance codes.”). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Scholars have noted the extreme lack of clarity in judicial treatment of the concept of 
stereotyping. See, e.g., Anita Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 ARK. L. REV. 27, 28 
(1990) (“Court opinions use the word [stereotype] without defining it.” (alteration added)). 
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There are three lines of cases in which female plaintiffs have had some 
success in challenging workplace appearance codes. First, some women have 
prevailed where they have demonstrated that the appearance code at issue 
required them to appear in sexualized or provocative clothing.59 Second, but 
closely related, is a series of cases in which courts have upheld challenges to 
certain airline maximum weight policies.60 Finally, some courts have found sex 
discrimination where women were required to wear uniforms but their male 
counterparts were permitted to dress in business attire.61 Each of these pockets of 
judicial skepticism of sex-differentiated appearance codes finds a mirror image 
in the reasoning of the Jespersen opinion. 
The Jespersen majority distinguished Price Waterhouse on the ground that, 
unlike the sex stereotyped notions applied to Ann Hopkins, those applied to 
Darlene Jespersen did not “single [her] out,” but rather these policies “applie[d] 
to all of the bartenders, male and female.”62 Harrah’s policy did not amount to 
“impermissible stereotyping,” said the court, first because it was not “intended 
to be sexually provocative” or to “stereotype women as sex objects.”63 Were a 
policy to do this, the court suggested, it could amount to an impermissible sex 
stereotype that would violate Title VII.64 
This focus on the stereotype of sexual attractiveness and availability—the 
requirement that women appear “sexy” and attractive at work—is a prominent, 
though at times ambivalent, underlying theme in the grooming cases.65 In those 
 
 59. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding in favor of the 
plaintiff where the court found as a matter of fact that defendant required her to wear a sexually 
provocative uniform in her job as an office building lobby attendant). See also discussion infra notes 
66–69 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 
Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 61. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979); 
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987); EEOC v. 
Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 WL 152 (E.D. Mo. 1981). See also infra notes 84–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 62. This assertion on the part of the court is almost patently ridiculous. The court insisted that 
the grooming policy was “for the most part unisex.” Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (alterations added). 
Judge Pregerson’s dissent pointed out that such reasoning would insulate any sex-differentiated 
appearance code so long as it contained some provisions that applied to both men and women and 
other burdensome and stereotypical requirements for both men and women. See id. at 1115–16 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 1112. 
 64. See id. (distinguishing Darlene Jespersen’s situation from that of Margaret Hasselman, the 
plaintiff in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., discussed infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text, who “was 
required to wear a uniform that was ‘short and revealing on both sides [such that her] thighs and 
portions of her buttocks were exposed.’” (alteration in original)) (quoting Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. 
Supp. at 604). 
 65. It is an ambivalent theme because of the BFOQ exception in Title VII. Even where an 
employer policy discriminates on the basis of sex, the employer may defend the policy by 
demonstrating that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification or, alternatively, that there exists a 
business necessity for a rule that has a disparate impact on one sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). 
The ironic result is that the more likely a grooming policy is to be held discriminatory on the basis of 
sex stereotyping because it forces women in the workplace to appear sexy, the more likely it will 
survive a Title VII challenge based on BFOQ or business necessity. This is because the most blatant 
sexually-charged dress codes exist in businesses that are geared toward selling sex. See Bartlett, supra 
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relatively rare instances in which female plaintiffs have prevailed in challenges 
to workplace grooming codes, the cases have sometimes involved what a court 
perceives as a sexually suggestive dress requirement that is unrelated to the 
main purpose of the defendant’s business.66 For example, in EEOC v. Sage Realty 
Corporation,67 one of the first cases to hold that an employer dress code violated 
Title VII, the court found in favor of a female lobby “hostess”68 in a New York 
City office building who was constructively discharged because she refused to 
wear what the court found was a revealing and sexually provocative costume.69 
Similarly, in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc. the plaintiff, like Darlene 
Jespersen, had amassed an “otherwise exemplary” employment record.70 
Nevertheless, she was fired from her position as a “flight hostess” when she 
 
note 34, at 2567–79 (discussing the Hooters litigation and stating that “[t]he area where the least 
visible progress has been made concerns businesses that are the most objectionable from the 
perspective of reducing the subordination of women: businesses that trade on women’s sexual 
objectification,” but noting that forcing these companies to “be explicit about the nature of [their] 
business” in order to fall under the BFOQ defense may actually be “beneficial in the long run” 
because of community norms that might “impose limits on the kinds of businesses employers are 
willing, explicitly, to defend”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (explaining and endorsing courts’ seemingly 
strange distinction between sexual-titillation cases involving sex businesses and those involving 
plus-sex businesses based on a normative worker-focused perfectionism). Professor Cruz has argued 
persuasively that the BFOQ exception does not apply to employer dress policies, and that the 
business necessity defense likewise is inapplicable because these are generally disparate treatment 
rather than disparate impact claims. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and 
Title VII, 5 NEV. L. J. 240 (2004). 
 66. Across the spectrum of cases involving challenges to workplace dress codes, challenges by 
men greatly predominate. Among these, suits involving hair length rules make up the largest 
proportion of the cases. And, with only a few exceptions, these challenges by men to hair length and 
other dress rules have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 
(11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907 (2d. Cir. 1996); Longo v. Carlisle 
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 
1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Female plaintiffs represent a 
minority in the dress cases, but they have been more likely than male plaintiffs to prevail in their 
challenges, and sometimes when their challenges have failed this has been because courts have 
determined that plaintiff’s dress was not the reason for the adverse employment action. See, e.g., 
Colafemina v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 1994 Mass Super. LEXIS 80 (D. Mass. 1994) 
(finding that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant’s legitimate reason for failing to promote 
her to the position of cocktail server was pretextual, where plaintiff claimed that she was not 
promoted because management believed that her breasts were too large); Marks v. Nat’l Commc’n 
Assoc., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that plaintiff had failed to show that 
overweight men were treated differently than overweight women). In sum, while relatively few 
dress and appearance code challenges have been successful, those that have been successful seem to 
share some notable characteristics, discussed in this Part. 
 67. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment on Title VII claim), aff’d, 507 F. Supp. at 599; Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 
613 (awarding plaintiff back pay, benefits, and attorneys’ fees after trial on her Title VII claim). 
 68. See Sage Realy Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 602 n.3. 
 69. The employer insisted that the costume was not sexually provocative or revealing, but the 
court found as a matter of fact that it was, and that the defendant was aware that wearing the 
costume had subjected Margaret Hasselman, the plaintiff-employee, to sexual harassment by 
building patrons. See id. at 610–11. 
 70. 692 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
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exceeded the airline’s maximum weight restrictions.71 The Ninth Circuit noted 
that “[t]he purpose of the weight program was, according to Continental, to 
create the public image of an airline which offered passengers service by thin, 
attractive women, whom executives referred to as Continental’s ‘girls.’”72 
Because there was no showing that slimness was necessary to perform the job of 
cabin attendant, and because men who performed similar functions were not 
subject to a maximum weight requirement, the court concluded that the sex-
targeted policy smacked of “occupational clichés” and “stereotypical notions of 
the roles of men and women” and constituted disparate treatment sex 
discrimination on its face. Continental’s admission that the policy’s purpose was 
to cater to the flying public’s desire to be served by sexually attractive women 
was a prominent factor in the court’s reasoning in support of its holding that the 
policy was discriminatory.73 The Jespersen court characterized the policy as “part 
of an overall program to create a sexual image for the airline.”74 
The other flight attendant cases in which female plaintiffs have prevailed in 
challenging sex-specific policies—though these were not appearance policies per 
se75 —similarly involved what courts considered to be stereotypical notions of 
female attractiveness and sexual availability. Thus, courts have invalidated 
airline rules that restricted flight attendant positions to young, single, childless 
women, holding that policies that prevented flight attendants from being 
married,76 having children, 77 or working beyond their early- to mid-thirties78 all 
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.79 In their attempts to 
 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. at 604. 
 73. See also Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 774 (D.D.C. 1973) (employer policy 
that, among other sex-differentiated provisions, required female but not male flight attendants to 
wear contact lenses rather than eyeglasses, violated Title VII), cited in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 
216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Laffey for the proposition that appearance standards that 
impose unequal burdens on men and women are impermissible). One cannot help but be reminded, 
reading these cases, of the famous Dorothy Parker quip, “Boys don’t make passes at girls who wear 
glasses,” and of the modern variation, “Boys don’t make passes at girls with fat asses.” IMDb, 
Memorable Quotes From “Will & Grace” (1998), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0157246/quotes 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 74. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing Gerdom). 
 75. There is some question whether even the weight cases are properly considered among the 
“grooming” or “appearance” cases. In Frank, the court determined that it “need not decide whether a 
rule or regulation that compels individuals to change or modify their physical structure or 
composition, as opposed to simply presenting themselves in a neat or acceptable manner, qualifies 
as an appearance standard,” because, even if they qualified as an appearance standard, Continental’s 
weight rules “would still be invalid.” Frank, 216 F.2d at 855. 
 76. See generally Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 965 (1981). 
 77. See In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 78. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 
(1971). 
 79. The Fifth Circuit had earlier held that it was impermissible sex discrimination for airlines to 
restrict hiring for the position to women. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inv. 442 F.2d 385 (5th 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The airlines, in response, changed the designation from 
“stewardess” to “flight attendant,” and opened the position to men. See generally Laffey v. Nw. 
Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, (D.D.C. 1973) (describing history of airline rules regarding flight 
attendants). 
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control these particular traits of its female flight attendants, the airlines tracked 
very closely those traits that the sexual selection literature posits as the desirable 
mating characteristics of human females: youth, fertility, health, and 
availability.80 
The other main hook upon which the Jespersen court hangs it hat concerns 
the extent to which the policy at issue interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to 
perform her job because she was a woman.81 In evaluating Harrah’s appearance 
policy—which tracked a social gender norm that women are at their “Personal 
Best” only in makeup and with styled hair while men can achieve theirs with 
unadorned faces and plain hair—the Jespersen majority determined that the 
company did not place a burden on women’s ability to perform their work.82 In 
both the “Unequal Burdens” portion of its opinion, and in the “Sex 
Stereotyping” portion, the decision turned largely upon this intuition on the part 
of the court. 
Dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that the makeup requirement alone—
because it applied differently on its face to men and women—established a 
prima facie case of discrimination,83 the Jespersen court held that, though 
different, the grooming requirements that applied to men and women were not 
unequal.84 According to the court, the makeup requirement was not burdensome 
 
 80. See, e.g., BUSS, EVOLUTION OF DESIRE, supra note 9, at 70 (“Men worldwide want physically 
attractive, young, and sexually loyal wives who will remain faithful to them until death.”); see also 
Buss, Sex Differences, supra note 9, at 1. 
 81. As discussed infra note 82, the Jespersen court did not quarrel with the undisputed evidence 
that the makeup rule interfered with Darlene Jespersen’s ability to perform her work because it 
burdened her as an individual. The court, however, distinguished this type of individual, subjective 
impediment to job performance from an impediment based on sex in some general sense. See 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that, if it were to 
agree that Jespersen’s personal objection to the makeup policy were sufficient to state a claim of sex 
stereotyping, the court “would come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or 
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her 
own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination”). 
 82. See id. at 1112. The court recognized that Darlene Jespersen herself was severely impacted in 
her ability to perform her job, but it rejected as unworkable and unwise the notion that the subjective 
reaction of an individual woman to a “reasonable” grooming policy could sustain a finding of sex 
discrimination. This objective burden test imposed by the court is closely analogous to the objective 
element of the unwelcomeness requirement in sexual harassment law. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 
U.S. 17 (1993). 
 83. In order to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, which encompasses the 
requirement of discriminatory intent, a plaintiff ordinarily must introduce either direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent, or if such direct evidence is unavailable, circumstantial evidence sufficient to 
raise an inference of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., HAROLD S. LEWIS & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 164–88 (West Group Publ’g 2d. ed. 2004). 
Normally, an employer policy that explicitly differentiates between female and male employees is the 
paradigm example of direct evidence of discriminatory intent and by itself states a disparate 
treatment claim; in such cases, a court will typically go on to determine whether the employer had 
demonstrated that the differential treatment was justified as a BFOQ. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. 
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (finding employer’s “fetal protection” policy applied to 
the reproductive capacity of females but not to males, and was thus illegal sex discrimination unless 
the employer could demonstrate a BFOQ). Appearance policies are uniquely exempted from this 
general rule that facially discriminatory policies satisfy the plaintiff’s prima facie showing. 
 84. This reasoning tracks the “difference/sameness” debate in feminist legal theory, except that 
there is no attempt by the court to reason that, in order to achieve employment equality, different 
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to women and had “only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.”85 In 
an exquisite example of circular reasoning, the court insisted that “[g]rooming 
standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially 
discriminatory.”86 Because the plaintiff had offered no evidence that “the 
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job,”87 
she failed to demonstrate that the policy was discriminatory. This focus on the 
issue of job impairment is evident in those cases that have found in favor of 
female plaintiffs who challenged sex-differentiated dress and grooming 
requirements. 
Apart from the sexualized appearance and flight attendant cases, female 
plaintiffs have also prevailed in challenging policies that required women, but 
not men, to wear uniforms at work. In the leading case of Carroll v. Talman 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago,88 the Seventh Circuit struck down such a 
policy because “when some employees are uniformed and others not there is a 
natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser 
professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business 
clothes.”89 Thus, the employer’s stated justifications for the policy “reveal[ed] 
that it [was] based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII.”90 In a 
similar case, another court found that “it is demeaning for one sex to wear a 
uniform when members of the other sex holding the same positions are allowed 
to wear professional business attire.”91 These cases suggest that where a dress 
code imposes a demeaning image upon one sex only, it constitutes 
discrimination under Title VII. 
 
treatment is necessary in this instance. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 39–76 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2003) (discussing feminist debate over equal 
versus special treatment and which approach is most likely to lead to true equality for women and 
men). Rather, the reasoning of the courts in the grooming cases seems to be that, because social 
norms posit that a “professional” and “attractive” appearance connotes different things for men and 
women, enforcing these differences makes everyone neat and attractive and, therefore, equal. 
 85. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 
1975)). 
 86. Id. at 1109–10 (emphasis supplied). 
 87. Id. at 1112. See also id. at 1113 (“Harrah’s grooming standards do not require Jespersen to 
conform to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to perform her job 
requirements as a bartender.”). 
 88. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 89. Id. at 1033. The Carroll court also rejected the unequal burdens analysis. It noted that “the 
dissent relies on the fact that the female dress code ‘did not substantially burden the female employees 
more than the male employees in the enjoyment of their jobs” (emphasis supplied), but that is not 
the criterion imposed in Section 703(a)(1) of the Act, for that Section was ‘intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” Id. 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)). See also O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. 
Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that employer’s dress code violated Title VII where only female 
employees were required to wear smocks); EEOC v. Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12388 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1981) (holding that an employer policy “requiring only female 
employees to contribute to the purchase of, and to wear a uniform is prima facie evidence of 
actionable discrimination,” and denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 90. Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033. 
 91. O’Donnell, 656 F. Supp. at 266. 
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Thus, the gender norms that are viewed by courts, explicitly or implicitly, 
as invidious are those that relate to female attractiveness and sexiness as well as 
those that relate to female competence and status.92 This is what distinguishes 
“appropriate” or “reasonable” sex-differentiated dress codes from unduly 
burdensome ones, and benign “norms” from inappropriate “stereotypes” in 
these cases. The categories of cases in which female plaintiffs prevail are those 
where employers are seen to be attempting to enhance the attractiveness or sex 
appeal of female employees for a position where attractiveness should not be 
relevant,93 and where female employees are compelled to wear uniforms though 
male employees are not.94 In the latter context, courts reason that such policies 
imply to customers that the uniformed female employees are of lesser status 
than the non-uniformed male employees.95 In addition, there is the patronizing 
suggestion that women are not capable of good judgment as to appropriate 
business attire because they are competitive and subject to fashion’s whim.96 
III. SEXUAL SELECTION AND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN HUMAN AND NONHUMAN 
ANIMALS: THE PEACOCK’S TAIL AND OTHER FANCY ACCOUTREMENTS 
Male and female peafowl look different: Peacocks have large, unwieldy 
and seemingly useless tails that they drag along behind them and then 
occasionally, with regal pomp, fan out in a spectacular display of blues, greens, 
and golds as they strut in circles and shimmy and vibrate their rear-ends. 
Peahens, in striking contrast, have short, drably colored tails. Though peafowl 
 
 92. Clearly, these sets of norms and stereotypes are often related, as when women are seen as 
suited for ornament rather than intellectual pursuits, or when their status is tied to their attachment 
to a high-status male which, in turn, is viewed as dependant on youth and physical attractiveness. 
 93. Courts uniformly hold in these cases that customer preference for attractive female 
attendants is not a defense. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982); Diaz 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inv. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). As 
Professor Yuracko has pointed out, however, there are two discreet areas in which courts do not 
always apply this rule. See Yuracko, supra note 65, at 147. 
 94. Courts emphasize that there is nothing inherently problematic about uniform requirements 
per se, but that the policies become impermissible when they are applied differently based upon the 
sex of the employee. See O’Donnell, 656 F. Supp. 263 (D. Ohio 1987); Clayton, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) at 841. 
 95. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033 (“While there is nothing offensive about uniforms per se, when 
some employees are uniformed and others are not there is a natural tendency to assume that the 
uniformed women have a lesser professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal 
business clothes.”). 
 96. Id. Although it was not the primary rationale by which the Court of Appeals found the 
uniform policy impermissible, the court was clearly troubled by the defendant’s attempt to justify 
the policy by reference to “dress competition among women” and women’s tendency to “follow the 
fashion” even where the fashion is problematic from the standpoint of appropriate “business 
judgment.” Id. (quoting employer’s stated justification for the policy). The court found that these 
justifications were grounded upon “offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII.” Id. As gender 
stereotypes go, this one seems to strike the court as invidious rather than harmless. It is interesting 
that this kind of competitiveness—in the context of fashion, attractiveness, and appearance—is 
gendered female and considered a demeaning stereotype, whereas “good competition”—over work, 
productivity, status—is more often gendered male. 
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present a very dramatic example of sexual dimorphism,97 they are only one of 
many species of birds, mammals, fish, and even insects that exhibit obvious 
male-female differences in coloration, size, or ornamentation. 
This Part lays the groundwork for understanding the evolutionary impetus 
for the sorts of showy dimorphisms in coloration and ornamentation—e.g. 
feathered crests or long tails, antlers, wattles, elaborate antennae—that are 
exemplified by the peacock and peahen. It then layers onto the description of 
basic evolutionary theory a discussion of cultural norms that inform the human 
practice of ornamentation and, specifically, sex- and gender-differentiated98 
social dress norms. 
A. The First Layer: Animal “Dress” and Sexual Selection 
As seen in the quotation at the start of this Article, Charles Darwin 
recognized sexual dimorphism within species and coined the term “sexual 
selection” to describe the process by which many such sex differences could 
evolve.99 Sexual selection, as distinct from natural selection,100 refers to a process 
by which the sexes evolve particular traits, generally divergent traits, based on 
the differential reproductive success101 conferred by those traits.102 Sexual 
selection theory remains the primary explanation among contemporary 
evolutionary biologists for most intra-species sex differences.103 Whereas natural 
 
 97. Dimorphism refers to “[t]he existence of two distinctly different types of individual within a 
species. An obvious example is sexual dimorphism in certain animals, in which the two sexes differ in 
colouring, size, etc.” OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY 178 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasis in original). 
 98. I use the word “gender” here, in addition to “sex,” because the cultural practice of layering 
social expectations and normative evaluations upon persons by various technologies including dress 
implicates the concept of gender as well as being tied to biological sex. 
 99. See DARWIN, supra note 1. See also CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION 
IN RELATION TO SEX (John Murray ed., 1882) [hereinafter DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN]. 
 100. Stated most simply, natural selection as first theorized by Darwin consists of two important 
steps: first there must arise heritable variation among individuals of a particular species; next, 
because some individuals, based on these differences, are better able to survive and pass along their 
genes to the next generation, over time individuals with such characteristics will come to 
predominate in the population. Given sufficient time and environmental pressure, Darwin posited 
that the process of natural selection would lead to speciation (i.e., the evolution of new species). See 
ERNST MAYR, WHAT EVOLUTION IS 117–20 (Basic Books 2001); see also OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
BIOLOGY, supra note 97, at 398. 
 101. An individual’s reproductive success, generally abbreviated as RS, is simply the sum total of 
offspring and offspring’s offspring that the individual has been able to produce. In other words, RS 
measures the individual’s ability to pass its genes to future generations. See RANDY THORNHILL & 
CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 5 (MIT 
Press 2000) (“We evolutionists use the term reproductive success to refer to th[ose] reproductive 
interests [of an individual], by which we mean not the mere production of offspring but the 
production of offspring that survive to produce offspring. A trait that increases this ability is ‘good’ 
in terms of natural selection even though one might consider it undesirable in moral terms.” 
(alteration added)). 
 102. A leading scholar in the field defines sexual selection as “the differences in reproduction 
that arise from variation among individuals in traits that affect success in competition over mates 
and fertilizations.” MALTE ANDERSSON, SEXUAL SELECTION 31 (Princeton University Press New Ed. 
ed. 1994). 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 13–17, 437 (discussing Darwin’s suggestion that most secondary sex traits, 
which have no direct role in insemination, arise because they confer success in competition over 
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selection can be expected to operate fairly uniformly upon members of a 
particular group, sexual selection can create different evolutionary pressures 
upon males and females in the group based largely upon the differing 
reproductive strategies of males and females of the species.104 
Until the 1970’s, most evolutionists accepted the idea of natural selection 
but ignored or disparaged Darwin’s theory of sexual selection.105 When they did 
recognize it as a valid explanatory model, they often viewed male competition 
for females—in contrast to female preference for certain traits—as the driving 
force behind sexual selection.106 If larger, stronger, more aggressive, or more 
dominant males tended to win the contest for access to reproductive females, 
those traits, if heritable, would be disproportionately passed on to future 
generations and would become widespread in the male population.107 
Explaining sexually dimorphic traits, Darwin argued that these came about 
where “individual males have had, in successive generations, some slight 
advantage over other males whether in their weapons, defence, or charms; and 
have transmitted these advantages to their male offspring.”108 Included in those 
“charms” would be traits, such as fancy tails, that females for some reason might 
prefer. 
Elaborating upon Darwin’s explanation, contemporary biologists typically 
distinguish two main types of sexual selection:109 “intrasexual competition” and 
 
mates, and concluding that “many secondary sex traits have now been shown [through 
experimentation] to be sexually selected”); HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK: ALTRUISM 
AND SEXUAL SELECTION FROM DARWIN TO TODAY 249 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (“Darwin was 
confident that eventually ‘the idea of sexual selection [would] . . . be much more largely accepted.’ It 
has taken more than a century. But his prediction has at last proved true.”) (alterations and ellipsis 
in original) (internal citations omitted). But see ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 16 (challenging orthodoxy 
of sexual selection as explanation for most sex dimorphisms). 
 104. See, e.g., ANDERSSON, supra note 102, at 31 (“Anisogamy and greater female than male 
parental effort is [sic] the likely reason for stronger male than female competition over mates.”) 
 105. For a wonderful description and analysis of this history, see generally CRONIN, supra note 
103, at 113–249. Summarizing the treatment of Darwin’s theory of sexual selection in the hundred 
years after it was first articulated, Cronin writes: “Throughout most of this period, sexual selection 
remained on the Darwinian sidelines, neglected, distorted or misunderstood. Natural selection 
suffered a partial eclipse for almost half a century after Darwin’s death. Sexual selection suffered an 
almost total eclipse for almost twice as long.” Id. at 243. 
 106. See id. at 114 (noting that the “attitude—accepting direct male competition but rejecting 
female choice—predominated throughout most of the theory’s history”). 
 107. A heritable genetic trait that confers a 1% reproductive advantage to an individual will, in 
only 265 generations, be present in the entire population. See Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality 
and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 
1165–66 n.80 (2001) (citing ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 28–29 (James W. Behnke & Jo 
Andrews eds., Benjamin/Cummings Publ’g Co. 1985)). As to the question why these traits should be 
expressed in males but not females, when both sexes share the same genetic endowment save for 
those genes on the Y chromosome, the answer in all likelihood stems from differential activation of 
genes. “The great majority of sex differences . . . are not sex linked, but sex limited. Sex limitation is 
the result of differential expression (activation) of genes which are present in both sexes.” LAURA 
MEALEY, SEX DIFFERENCES: DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES 13 (2000) (emphasis in 
original). 
 108. DARWIN, supra note 1, at 222. 
 109. Though Darwin mentioned both weapons and charms, some feminist biologists have noted 
that intersexual selection resulting from female preference for certain male traits was for many 
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“intersexual competition.” Male-male competition for females110 that takes the 
form of fighting, dominance, and status-seeking is referred to as intrasexual 
competition. In contrast, selection that is more easily understood in the context 
of female preference for certain male characteristics is known as intersexual 
selection.111 
Both intersexual and intrasexual selection pressures can result in evolution 
of fancy “dress” in animals. Where males and females differ in ornamentation or 
coloring, the male of the species is the “fancier” sex in the overwhelming 
majority of cases.112 Evolutionary analysis suggests that this is because in most 
species access to females is the major limiting factor in reproductive success.113 
Physiological differences—and, according to evolutionary psychologists, 
cognitive, behavioral and emotional differences—between males and females 
stem largely from their differing reproductive strategies.114 
 
decades ignored or disparaged by evolutionists because it contradicted closely held beliefs about the 
extent of female agency. See Andreas Paul, Sexual Selection and Mate Choice, 23 INT’L J. PRIMATOLOGY 
877, 878 (2002); Patricia Adair Gowaty, Sexual Natures: How Feminism Changed Evolutionary Biology, 28 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC. 901, 908–12 (2003). 
 110. Note that male competition and female choosiness are the usual patterns among most 
species, and especially among mammals, though there are exceptions to this rule. See ANDERSSON, 
supra note 102, at 10 (“In the minority of species with mainly paternal care, the sex differences in 
parental roles can override the effects of anisogamy and lead to a reversal of other aspects of sex 
roles and sexual dimorphism.”); id. at 177–82 (describing and explaining sex-role reversal). In 
addition, feminist scientists in recent years have made clear that, even in species in which this 
general rule prevails, the reality is much more complex and nuanced than previously imagined. See 
Patricia Adair Gowaty et al., Indiscriminate Females and Choosy Males: Within- and Between-Species 
Variation in Drosophila, 57 EVOLUTION 2037 (2003); Patricia Adair Gowaty et al., Male House Mice 
Produce Fewer Offspring with Lower Viability and Poorer Performance When Mated with Females They Do 
Not Prefer, 65 ANIMAL BEHAV. 95 (2003). This recent work suggests that mate selection is a dialectic 
process with significant choice exercised by both males and females, and with significant fitness 
effects demonstrated when that choice is constrained. 
 111. See MAYR, supra note 100, at 138. In addition, recent scholarship in the field has identified a 
third major component of sexual selection: “male-female conflict.” See, e.g., C. Cordero & W.G. 
Eberhard, Female Choice of Sexually Antagonistic Male Adaptations: A Critical Review of Some Current 
Research, 16 J. EVOLUTIONARY BIOL. 1 (2003); Andrew Sih et al., Path Analysis and the Relative 
Importance of Male-Female Conflict, Female Choice and Male-Male Competition in Water Striders, 63 
ANIMAL BEHAV. 1079 (2002) (stating that of the three major behavioral mechanisms underlying 
sexual selection, that of male-female conflict has been the least studied). According to a recent 
literature review, “[i]mportant theoretical and empirical developments have suggested new 
interpretations of sexual selection. Some evolutionary phenomena that were previously explained by 
mate choice or intrasexual competition, may be better explained by coevolution of males and 
females that result [sic] from conflicts of interest between the sexes, in which females evolve to avoid 
natural selection costs.” Id. at 1. 
 112. See MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WING 265 (W.H. Freeman 2d ed. 2002) (“In most species 
of birds and mammals, males are at least somewhat larger, more conspicuous, more competitive, 
more variable in reproductive success, and less caring toward their offspring than females.”). 
 113. “In most species, males are the more competitive sex, and females choosier, because 
potential rates of reproduction are greater for males than for females. For example, human males 
can, in principle, produce offspring at the rate of one every few weeks or months; human females 
can, at best, produce offspring every few years.” DOUG JONES, PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS AND THE 
THEORY OF SEXUAL SELECTION: RESULTS FROM FIVE POPULATIONS 21 (Univ. of Mich. Museum 1996). 
 114. Strategy is used here in the biological sense; there is no normative implication. A 
reproductive strategy is merely a possible way of passing genes onto the next generation. A 
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In biology, “male” and “female” are defined in a very specific manner:115 
“those individuals we label ‘female’ are individuals that produce relatively 
large, nutrient-rich, immobile gametes (sex cells); males are those individuals 
that produce relatively small, nutrient poor, mobile gametes.”116 This division 
into two distinct gametal types—termed “anisogamy” —has all manner of 
repercussions for the organisms that produce them due to the simple 
definitional fact that “sperm is [relatively] cheap.”117 Furthermore, among 
mammals and other groups that internally gestate their offspring, it is almost 
invariably118 the female of the species that does so. This disparity between males 
and females in the initial parental investment119 results in pressure for females to 
be relatively “choosy” and males to be relatively promiscuous.120 This variance in 
 
successful strategy likewise implies only reproductive success, not moral approval. See Seaman, 
supra note 31, at 349 n.61. 
 115. In contrast, psychologists generally distinguish sex from gender and identify several 
individual components of sex and gender that result in a spectrum rather than a simple male-female 
binary. These components include chromosomal sex, fetal gonadal sex, fetal hormonal balance, fetal 
brain development, assigned gender, gender identity, and pubertal hormones. See MEALEY, supra 
note 107, at 11–23 (discussing sex and gender and describing sexologist John Money’s “Eight 
Elements of Sex and Gender”). 
 116. Id. at 47. Not all species reproduce sexually, and of those that do, not all consist of two sexes 
that can be defined thus as male and female. Many species reproduce asexually; some reproduce 
both asexually and sexually; and some, such as slime molds, are made up of multiple mating types. 
See id. However, sexual reproduction and two distinct “male” and “female” mating types is the most 
common pattern of reproduction in nature. See DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN 
SEXUALITY 21 (Oxford University Press, USA 1979) (“[A]mong nonhermaphroditic, many-celled 
animals that reproduce sexually there are two and only two sexes, defined on the basis of the sex 
cells they produce: a female produces eggs, which are large and carry a reserve of food for the 
embryo; a male produces sperm, which are small and possess a taillike organ to enable them to reach 
the egg.”). But see ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 16, at 75–105 (arguing that there are multiple 
expressions in nature—and often within species—of “maleness” and “femaleness”). 
 117. Linda Mealey attributes this phrase to anthropologist Donald Symons. She points out that 
the phrase is grammatically incorrect—”it should be ‘sperm are cheap.’” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 
76. 
 118. There are a few—very few—exceptions to this rule. “Of all sex-role-reversed species, the 
only ones which are viviparous [offspring are born live rather than laying eggs] are seahorses and 
pipefish—which have male gestation.” Id. at 77 (citing A. Berglund et al., Reversed Sex Roles and 
Parental Energy Investment in Zygotes of Two Pipefish (Syngnathidae) Species, 29 MARINE ECOL. 
PROGRESS 209 (1986)) (alteration added). 
 119. Parental investment refers to energy and resources devoted to offspring. It includes such 
components as gametal production, provision of resources to offspring, and protection of offspring. 
For female mammals, parental investment also includes gestation and nursing. See Robert L. Trivers, 
Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 1871–1971, at 
136 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972). 
 120. See id. at 136. According to a recent academic text on sex differences in human and 
nonhuman animals, “the consequences of anisogamy—that males are typically more mobile, have a 
higher sex drive, and seek multiple partners—are that attracting a sexual partner for a female is a 
fairly easy task. (As we all know, males of our own species are not infrequently known to be willing 
to even pay for sexual access.) This circumstance allows females an element of choosiness when it 
comes to purely sexual partnering.” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 118. The descriptors “coy” and 
“eager” have often been used to describe the behaviors of females and males, respectively. See, e.g., 
DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN, supra note 99, at 225 (“The female, on the other hand, with the rarest 
exceptions, is less eager than the male . . . she generally ‘requires to be courted;’ she is coy, and may 
often be seen endeavouring for a long time to escape from the male.” (quoting HUNTER, ESSAYS AND 
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optimal reproductive strategy between males and females creates a dynamic by 
which males will tend to compete for scarce access to female reproductive 
partners, and by which females will discriminate among prospective males for 
sperm to fertilize her expensive eggs.121 
This basic evolutionary pattern sets up a dynamic by which males may 
come to possess weaponry, status badges, bright coloration, lovely song, 
dramatic tail feathers, combs, and wattles. All of these reveal competition 
among males for access to females. Where such competition tends toward a 
male-male struggle in which the victor “gets the girl,” intrasexual competition 
predominates and favors development of such “masculine” characteristics as 
extreme size and aggression, status badges,122 and weaponry such as tusks, 
horns, or fangs. Alternatively, the competition may emphasize female choice 
rather than male power: In “lekking” species,123 for example, males gather in a 
large group—a “lek”—to display their charms, and females choose the males 
with which to mate.124 
 
OBSERVATIONS 194 (Owen ed., 1961)); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 140–65 (Oxford 
University Press, USA 1st ed. 1986) (discussing intersexual and intrasexual competition using game 
theory, and labeling female reproductive strategies “coy” and “fast”). As Helena Cronin has pointed 
out, however accurate as a general matter these terms may be, they are quite loaded. She notes that 
“it has become standard to talk of ‘coy females (and ‘eager males’),” and that she “can’t resist 
wondering what words would be used if the sex-roles were reversed. Would a (male) investor or 
business executive be called coy for not rushing headlong into the first option? If males were choosy 
about mates, would they be ‘coy’—or discriminating, judicious, responsible, prudent, discerning? 
(And, by the way, would females be ‘eager’—or would they be wonton, frivolous, wayward, 
brazen?).”  CRONIN, supra note 103, at 248. 
 121. This summary is an oversimplified account of evolutionary theory and data that omits 
much detail and complexity, including exceptions to this general account, such as “sex role 
reversals,” that are usually traced to certain environmental conditions. See, e.g., KONNER, supra note 
105 at 264–67. However, as Professor Konner states, “even the exceptions prove the rule,” id. at 264, 
and “species with partly reversed sex roles illuminate the evolutionary process and prove that 
gender as we know it is not irrevocably set in the genes. But important as they are for theory, they 
are exceptions.” Id. at 265. 
 122. Status badges are traits that “can serve as signals of potential aggression, so individuals 
(male or female) typically refrain from challenging others whose signals indicate they would be 
likely to accept the challenge and triumph in a physical contest.” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 96–98 
(citing S. Rohwer & P.W. Ewald, The Cost of Dominance and Advantage of Subordination in a Badge 
Signaling System, 35 EVOLUTION 441 (1981); S.A. Adamo & R.T. Hanlon, Do Cuttlefish (Cephalopoda) 
Signal Their Intentions to Conspecifics During Agonistic Encounters?, 52 ANIMAL BEHAV. 73 (1996); T. 
Jarvi & M. Bakken, The Function of the Variation in the Breast Stripe of the Great Tit (Parus Major), 32 
ANIMAL BEHAV. 590 (1984); Ligon et al., Male-Male Competition, Ornamentation and the Role of 
Testosterone in Sexual Selection in Red Jungle Fowl, 40 ANIMAL BEHAV. 367 (1990); A.P. Moller, Variation 
in Badge Size in Male House Sparrows Passer Domesticus: Evidence for Status Signalling, 37 ANIMAL 
BEHAV. 1637 (1987); A. P. Moller, Sexual Behavior is Related to Badge Size in the House Sparrow Passer 
Domesticus, 27 BEHAV. ECOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 23 (1990); P. J. Moore et al., Odour Conveys Status on 
Cockroaches, 389 NATURE 25 (1997)). 
 123. Lekking species are those “in which males congregate and display on particular patches of 
ground, ground that is used only for this purpose—not for food or cover or anything else. The 
females visit the males there and apparently look them over . . . the lek is a meeting place for 
mating.” CRONIN, supra note 103, at 222. 
 124. “By lekking, [males] simply advertise their ‘quality’—how well they have survived, what 
great risks they can take by displaying, how strong their sons might be . . . . Females visit the lek, 
assess male quality, and choose a male.” BOBBI S. LOW, WHY SEX MATTERS: A DARWINIAN LOOK AT 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 50 (Princeton Univ. Press 2000) (alteration added). 
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Where competition takes the latter form—which tends to emphasize female 
choice—males are most likely to possess the fanciest dress, such as the peacock’s 
tail.125 Though evolutionary biologists long professed to be baffled by the 
seemingly irrational preferences of females that might lead to a male trait such 
as the peacock’s tail,126 in recent years there has been an upsurge of interest 
among scientists in the area of female choice.127 Several theories have been 
 
 125. Though on the surface it might seem reasonably accurate to attribute most weaponry to 
male-male competition and most fancy ornament to female choice, in fact the relationship is much 
more complex and has only recently begun to be studied in detail by animal behaviorists. In fact, it is 
very difficult to tease apart the various sexual selection pressures on sexually dimorphic traits. Some 
studies of these traits have revealed simultaneous—at times conflicting—pressures resulting from 
intrasexual and intersexual competition upon the same trait. See Sih et al., supra note 111 (finding 
that male size in the stream-dwelling water strider was simultaneously affected by all three 
mechanisms of male-male competition, female choice, and male-female conflict); Cordero & 
Eberhard, supra note 111 (arguing that female choice, in addition to male-female conflict, could 
simultaneously contribute to the evolution of male traits that had been attributed solely to male-
female conflict). In addition, there is a dialectical quality by which “intersexual selection pressures 
imposed by female choice on the display of males can set up further intrasexual selection pressures 
of males competing with other males and vice versa.” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 123 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, interesting research has recently shown that male 
aggressive traits (that would figure more prominently in male-male competitive selection) may be 
co-opted to become courtship display traits important in female choice selection. See Gerald Borgia & 
Seth William Coleman, Co-option of Male Courtship Signals from Aggressive Display in Bowerbirds, 267 
PROC. R. SOC. LONDON 1735 (2000). 
 126. Darwin believed that females of species such as peafowl preferred beauty out of an aesthetic 
sense similar to that which led humans to admire art and music. He wrote that “a great number of 
male animals . . . have been rendered beautiful for beauty’s sake,” because such “beauty may serve 
as a charm for the female, and for no other purpose.” DARWIN, SEXUAL SELECTION, supra note 99, at 
92, 152–53 (quoted in CRONIN, supra note 103). Cronin states that Darwin failed to “face up to the 
most serious aspect of this irrationality: the fact that the choice is for costly and often grossly 
extravagant characteristics.” CRONIN, supra note 103. She notes that “[t]o require the male to deck 
himself out in gaudy colours, or sport a long tail, or sing and dance for hours on end is to impose a 
heavy burden on him.” Id. at 185. Male traits such as this one are viewed as a liability in terms of 
purely natural selection because they may attract predators as well as fertile females and may 
hamper the animal’s ability to escape. In addition, they require an enormous amount of energy to 
maintain and carry around. Evolutionists seemed either to view such silly choices as simply an 
animal manifestation of the stereotypical female focus on decoration instead of substance, or to reject 
the idea of sexual selection altogether and rely on alternative explanations for the male ornaments. 
See id. at 133–46 (summarizing history of sexual selection debate as related to proposals made to 
explain coloration without selection). It has been found, however, that “[i]n the wild, peacocks that 
had been successful at attracting mates were more likely to be alive the following year than cocks 
that had been unsuccessful,” demonstrating that “[s]omehow, females do make accurate choices” 
about male health and vigor. MEALEY, supra note 107, at 123 (alterations added). 
 127. See Paul, supra note 109, at 878 (“[S]ince the 1970s, the theory of sexual selection and mate 
choice has experienced a fulminant revival, with major new theoretical insights and empirical 
findings.” (alteration added)). This is likely related to the influx of women into the fields of biology, 
primatology, ethology, and related areas. See Griet Vandermassen, Sexual Selection: A Tale of Male 
Bias and Feminist Denial, 11 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 9 (2004); Anne Fausto-Sterling, Patricia Adair 
Gowaty, and Marlene Zuk, Evolutionary Psychology and Darwinian Feminism, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 403, 
409 (1997) (“Over the last decade and a half, however, ideas about animal sexual behavior and the 
evolution of sexual differences have undergone a revolution. During the 1970s women flooded into 
the field of animal behavior—especially the study of primates.”). 
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advanced as to why females might exhibit preferences for such fancy and 
extravagant accoutrements as the peacock’s tail.128 
There are several models of mate choice that attempt to explain female 
preference for certain male characteristics, most notably the extreme and costly 
ornaments such as the peacock’s tail. The “runaway process” (or “sexy sons”) 
model posits that “females gain indirect genetic benefits by choosing attractive 
males, not because they are genetically superior in any way, but because females 
with a strong preference for attractive males will have attractive sons and, 
ultimately, more grand-offspring than females mating with less attractive 
males.”129 There is clearly a circular quality to this model: it does not explain the 
original female preference but only how, once assumed, such a preference 
would enhance reproductive success. However, there is empirical support for 
the theory in several studies across a variety of insect and fish species.130 It is 
possible that a male trait that originally is preferred based on a sensory 
predisposition that is otherwise unrelated to reproduction could set up a process 
of runaway selection that would favor the male ornament simply because other 
females are likely to find it attractive and thus mate preferentially with the “sexy 
sons” of the females who prefer the trait.131 
In addition to the sexy sons or runaway hypothesis, there are several 
versions of the “good genes” hypothesis for female preference for male 
ornaments and other showy traits. Common to all of these variations on the 
good genes hypothesis is the assumption that the particular trait is an honest 
signal for good genes in the male who wears it. The most straightforward of 
these theories, and one for which there is growing empirical support, suggests 
that the appearance of the ornament directly correlates with good health 
because, for example, bright colors indicate low parasite load.132 Several studies 
have now shown correlations between bright coloration in birds and low 
parasite load.133 In their original study, biologists William Hamilton and Marlene 
Zuk tested their hypothesis of an interaction between parasite resistance and 
 
 128. See generally ANDERSSON, supra note 102 (containing detailed discussion of possible 
mechanisms of competition over mates, including scrambles, endurance rivalry, contests, mate 
choice (including Fisherian runaway selection, indicator mechanisms, species recognition, direct 
phenotypic benefits, sensory bias, and mating synchronization and stimulation), and sperm 
competition). 
 129. Id. at 885. See also RONALD A. FISHER, THE GENETICAL THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 146–56 
(Dover 2d ed. 1958). 
 130. See Paul, supra note 109, at 885. 
 131. See Michael J. Ryan, Sexual Selection and Mate Choice, in BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY: AN 
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 181 (J.R. Krebs & N.B. Davies, eds., Blackwell 1997) (noting that sexual 
selection of certain male traits “could result from pleiotropic effects, such as sensory adaptations for 
predator avoidance or prey detection, which can then affect mating preferences”); see generally 
Michael J. Ryan, Sexual Selection, Sensory Systems and Sensory Exploitation, 7 OXFORD SURVEYS 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOL. 157 (1990). 
 132. See William D. Hamilton & Marlene Zuk, Heritable True Fitness and Bright Birds: A Role for 
Parasites?, 218 SCI. 384, 384 (1982); see also Gerald S. Wilkinson et al., Male Eye Span in Stalk-Eyed Flies 
Indicates Genetic Quality By Meiotic Drive Suppression, 391 NATURE 276, 277–78 (1998). 
 133. See M. Petrie, Improved Growth and Survival of Offspring of Peacocks with More Elaborate Trains, 
371 NATURE 598 (1994); see also JT Manning & M.A. Hartley, Symmetry and Ornamentation are 
Correlated in the Peacock’s Train, 42 ANIMAL BEHAV. 1020 (1991). 
14__SEAMAN.DOC 2/8/2007 2:08 PM 
 THE PEAHEN’S TALE 449 
male coloration and song complexity and found that the showiest species of 
North American birds were those that were most susceptible to parasite 
infection.134 They tentatively concluded that these species evolved their showy 
traits as a signal to females of individual health and vigor, whereas non-
susceptible species would be less likely to evolve such traits. 
A variation on this model is the “handicap theory” of mate choice. This 
theory posits that the fancy ornament signals genetic quality and robust health 
precisely because of its otherwise detrimental affect on male fitness: Only the 
most robust and fit males could manage to survive while supporting such a 
useless, energy-demanding appendage that tends to attract predators and 
hinder escape.135 
Finally, recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that at least in some 
species, both males and females prefer mates who are particularly suited to 
them individually.136 Rather than positing a single male or female who possesses 
the “best genes” and with whom all opposite sex individuals should choose to 
mate if they are able, this model proposes that “good genes” may mean different 
things to different individuals. For example, a female might, all else being equal, 
choose to mate with the male whose immunological traits most complement 
hers, or who will allow her offspring the greatest degree of genetic variability.137 
This last model emphasizes female agency and the role of free female 
choice in reproductive success. Recent studies have demonstrated that 
constraints on mate choice can have detrimental consequences for the well-being 
of the female as well as the fecundity of the group.138 In a series of experiments 
 
 134. See Hamilton & Zuk, supra note 132, at 386. 
 135. See Amotz Zahavi, Mate Selection—A Selection for a Handicap, 53 J. THEORETICAL BIOL. 205 
(1975); see also CRONIN, supra note 103, at 195–97 (discussing example of male pelicans that grow 
large bumps on their beaks during mating season that make it difficult for them to see; according to 
Zahavi, “The point of the exercise is to show off, and to do so reliably. ‘Look how well I can feed 
myself, even with this great big bump in front of my eyes!’”). In an anecdote that illustrates the force 
as well as the great irony of the handicap theory, it is said that President William Henry Harrison 
campaigned against Martin Van Buren by emphasizing his masculinity in contrast to Van Buren, 
whom he portrayed as an effeminate dandy in “ruffled shirt and silken hose.” “Harrison won the 
election, but on the day William Henry Harrison took the oath of office it was bitter cold. Lest he 
appear weak and unmanly, he refused to wear a topcoat and caught pneumonia and died one month 
after taking office.” RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 159 (citing M. KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA 39 
(Free Press 1995)). 
 136. See Jerram L. Brown, A Theory of Mate Choice Based on Heterozygosity, 8 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 60, 
60 (1997) (developing theorical and empirical support for the hypotheses that: “(1) What is best for 
one female may not be best for another; (2) even if the ‘best’ male is found, his superiority may be 
due to heterozygosity at one or more loci, hence not simply heritable (heterozygosity is not an 
allele); (3) mate choice amplifies the chief advantage of sexuality, namely genetic diversification” 
and concluding that “a female’s strategy should be to find the alleles that best complement her own 
in at least some of her offspring”); Jeanne A. Zeh & David W. Zeh, The Evolution of Polyandry I: 
Intragenomic Conflict and Genetic Incompatibilty, 263 PROC. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1711 (1996) (“present[ing] 
the hypothesis that, by mating with more than one male, females can reduce the threat to their 
[Reproductive Success] of genetic incompatibility” that arises from genetic conflict at the molecular 
level) (alterations added). 
 137. See Brown, supra note 136, at 62 (discussing the immunological incompatibility theory of 
mate choice and the heterozygosity theory of mate choice). 
 138. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND HOW THEY SHAPE 
THE HUMAN SPECIES 41–42 (Pantheon 1st ed. 1999) (discussing the work of evolutionary biologist 
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across five different species, evolutionary biologist Patricia Adair Gowaty has 
found that females who were able to mate with their preferred male had 
offspring with increased rates of viability and reproductive success.139 The same 
experiments showed identical results when the sexes were reversed and the 
males were permitted free choice of mates.140 Furthermore, these studies 
demonstrate that the preferred male is different for different females; there is no 
absolute genetic fitness independent of the selecting female. With respect to 
sexual selection and sexually dimorphic traits, these studies highlight the 
relevance of subtle variations in the “dress” of individuals and the dangers of 
uniformity, both genetic and apparent. 
A final aspect of animal dress should be noted because it is, perhaps, the 
facet that is most analogous to human dress in that it involves behavior that is 
decorative, rather than an animal’s purely physiological features. This is the 
practice of some animals, most notably the male bowerbird of Australia, to 
create decorative displays which females evaluate in order to choose 
reproductive partners.141 Male bowerbirds build elaborate structures known as 
bowers and then attempt to entice females to enter and mate.142 Many species 
decorate their bowers with colorful objects such as berries, feathers, shells, and 
other found treasures. In addition, certain species show preferences for specific 
 
Patricia Adair Gowaty and Geneticist William Rice in evaluating the possibilities of “free female 
choice”). 
 139. See generally Cynthia K. Bluhn & Patricia Adair Gowaty, Social Constraints on Female Mate 
Preference in Mallards’ Anas Platyrhynchos Decrease Offspring Viability and Mother Productivity, 68 
ANIMAL BEHAV. 977 (2004); Lee C. Drickhamer et al., Free Female Mate Choice in House Mice Affects 
Reproductive Success and Offspring Viability and Performance, 59 ANIMAL BEHAV. 371 (2000); Patricia 
Adair Gowaty et al., Mutual Interest Between the Sexes and Reproductive Success in Drosophilia 
Pseudoobscura, 56 EVOLUTION 2437 (2002). 
 140. See generally Patricia Adair Gowaty et al., Male House Mice Produce Fewer Offspring with Lower 
Viability and Poorer Performance When Mated with Females They Do Not Prefer, 65 ANIMAL BEHAV. 95 
(2003). This result challenges conventional sexual selection wisdom, which tends to assume that 
males of most species do not engage in significant sexual selection of females, and which tends to 
ignore variation among females. In other words, Professor Gowaty’s groundbreaking work provides 
strong evidence that—at least in the species she has studied—sexual selection is a dialectical process 
operating on both males and females. This research suggests that both males and females compete 
for and choose their mates. 
 141. See MEALEY, supra note 107, at 91–92. Mealey remarks upon the strong analogy to human 
culture: “In one of the more interesting twists of evolution (perhaps interesting because it is so 
blatant in our own species), the males of some species use objects for sexual signaling.” Id. at 91. I 
would like to thank Sarah Brosnan for bringing this example to my attention. 
 142. The bowers are not nests; the females do not lay eggs in the bowers. Rather, the bowers are 
used only for courtship displays and mating. Bowerbirds are a “lekking” species, and the male does 
not contribute parental care or resources to the female or to the offspring. Information about 
bowerbirds is available on a website maintained by Professor Gerald Borgia, an authority on the 
birds. See Professor Gerald Borgia, Borgia Lab, University of Maryland, Sexual Selection in 
Bowerbirds, http://www.life.umd.edu/biology/borgialab/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Professor 
Borgia’s research has demonstrated that the bower serves a protective function for the female in that 
a well-constructed bower allows the female to observe the aggressive courtship display of the male 
without being herself threatened with coerced mating. See Borgia, supra note 28, at 542. This brings 
to mind a quotation about fashion attributed to Sophia Loren: “A woman’s dress should be like a 
barbed-wire fence: serving its purpose without obstructing the view.” JAMES B. SIMPSON, SIMPSON’S 
CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS (1988), available at http://www.bartleby.com/63/42/6042.html (last 
visited December 13, 2006). 
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colors: the satin bowerbird female favors blue decorations, and males will go to 
elaborate lengths, including stealing from other males, to obtain blue objects for 
their bowers. This is an example of a sexual dimorphism in a nonhuman animal 
whereby one sex—here, the male—deliberately decorates his immediate 
environment so as to send certain signals to the other—here, the female—in 
order to gain reproductive advantage.143 
The themes of the animal dress literature and of sexual selection theory 
more generally thus emerge as centered around social signaling (i.e. 
communication), competition, power, and status. These themes are remarkably 
consistent with those seen in the interdisciplinary scholarship on human dress, 
discussed in the next section. 
B. Adding a Layer: Human Dress 
Clothing and other additions to, or modifications of, the human body have 
drawn interest from scholars in many fields, including sociology, psychology, 
philosophy, art history, and anthropology.144 Many of the recent 
interdisciplinary treatments of dress reveal intriguing similarities to the sexual 
selection literature. In particular, human dress has clear gender associations and 
is almost always sexually “dimorphic” in some respects.145 Most obviously, the 
signaling functions of dress are closely analogous to the functions of animal 
dress as evolutionary adaptations.146 On the other hand, dress in contemporary 
 
 143. This language, which implies conscious motivation, is used as a convenience but is 
sometimes cause for confusion. The behaviors evolve because they tend to further reproductive 
success and therefore are differentially passed along; however, there is not necessarily any 
motivation—conscious or otherwise—on the part of individuals to gain reproductive advantage. See, 
e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 50 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 1st ed. 1986) (“In practice it 
is usually convenient, as an approximation, to regard the individual body as an agent ‘trying’ to 
increase the numbers of all its genes in future generations. I shall use the language of convenience.”); 
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE ANCESTOR’S TALE 5 (2004) (“From our human point of view, the emergence 
of our remote fish ancestors from water to land was a momentous step, an evolutionary right of 
passage . . . . That is not the way it was at the time. Those Devonian fish had a living to earn. They 
were not on a mission to evolve, not on a quest towards the distant future.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Joanne Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson, Introduction: Body Dressing, in BODY DRESSING, 
supra note 3, at 1 (“Interdisciplinarity has gained ground across the humanities and social sciences 
and scholars have approached fashion and dress from a number of perspectives that have 
challenged the marginal place of fashion within tradition academic scholarship.”); CHARLOTTE 
SUTHRELL, UNZIPPING GENDER: SEX, CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURE (2004) (comparative 
ethnographic study of male to female cross-dressing, including deep examination of gender norms 
and gender barriers embodied in clothing, in Britain and India); DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND 
MEANING (Ruth Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher eds., 1992); CAROLINE DALEY, GIRLS & WOMEN, MEN & 
BOYS: GENDER IN TARADALE 1886–1930 (Auckland Univ. Press 1999); ANNETTE LYNCH, DRESS, 
GENDER AND CULTURAL CHANGE: ASIAN AMERICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN RITES OF PASSAGE (Berg 
Publishers 1999); RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4; CRANE, supra note 17; BARNARD, supra note 14. 
 145. See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 17, at 16 (arguing that, although clothing fashions communicate 
messages about class hierarchy and social power, “their principal messages are about the ways in 
which women and men perceive their gender roles or are expected to perceive them”); BARNARD, 
supra note 14, at 112 (noting that, while sex differences in dress are virtually universal, they vary 
widely in the particulars of what denotes masculinity and femininity in dress). 
 146. All of the various “good genes” hypotheses of mate choice necessarily assume that the 
character trait preferred by the female in some way signals health, vigor, or other quality beneficial 
to reproductive success. 
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Western society is characterized by fancy females and plain males,147 which 
seems counter to the prevalent pattern among nonhuman animals. It may be 
that this curious feature of modern Western human dress reveals something 
important about the interaction between biology and culture in the formation of 
human gender roles and differences. 
A few preliminary points are in order. First, though variously defined by 
different authors and in different academic fields, this article adopts the broad 
definition of dress suggested by interdisciplinary scholars Joanne Eicher and 
Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins. Combining the related categories of “body 
modifications” and “body supplements,” these scholars recognize that “the 
dressed person is a gestalt that includes body, all direct modifications of the 
body itself, and all three-dimensional supplements added to it.” “Dress,” as 
defined by Eicher and Roach-Higgins, includes everything that is left of this 
package once the body itself is separated out.148 Thus, it includes, in addition to 
clothing, all manner of body modifications and supplements such as deliberately 
made scars, tattoos, perfumes, hairstyles, foot coverings, jewelry, and hand-held 
accessories.149 While dress is defined as ultimately distinct from the unmodified 
body, recognizing that human dress is, at bottom, a gestalt that is in some 
fundamental way inseparable from that unadorned body serves to make the 
analogy to nonhuman dress that much more apparent. 
Second, in evolutionary terms, an adaptation is defined as such largely 
based on an examination of its function.150 The prior section analyzed the 
function of gender-differentiated dress in nonhuman animals so as to tease apart 
the various selection pressures that likely led to the evolution of those dress 
differences. This section turns to human dress and the gender norms and signals 
 
 147. This general pattern whereby the females tend to be the more highly ornamented and 
colorful sex has not always been the rule among humans. For example, during the Renaissance in 
Europe and continuing through the reign of Henry IV into the Seventeenth Century, men adopted a 
body-revealing and sexualized style of dress that was highly adorned and ornamented. See 
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 156–58 (describing rise of male decorative and sexualized dress during 
the Renaissance and Cavalier periods). 
 148. Eicher & Roach-Higgins, supra note 4, at 13 (emphasis in original). Eicher and Roach-
Higgins recognize that this separation is somewhat fictive and can only be accomplished through 
“mental manipulation.” See id. Some authors distinguish clothing from fashion, with fashion 
connoting change, trendiness, and the simultaneous desires to be part of the social whole and to 
distinguish one’s individuality. See BARNARD, supra note 14, at 7–24; J.C. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF CLOTHES (1930). 
 149. See id. at 15–16. As this classification system makes clear, humans are almost infinitely 
creative when it comes to dress: “Parts of the body that can be modified include hair, skin, nails, 
muscular-skeletal system, teeth, and breath.” Id. at 16. 
 150. Evolutionary biologists generally recognize a feature of an organism as an adaptation when 
“it solves an adaptive problem with ‘reliability, efficiency, and economy.’” Leda Cosmides & John 
Tooby, Univ. of Cal. Santa Barbara Ctr. for Evolutionary Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology: A 
Primer, http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html (quoting GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, 
ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1966)). Thus, the definition of an adaptation focuses upon the function of the 
trait: one cannot determine whether a particular trait solves an adaptive problem unless one 
understands the function of the trait—what the trait does in the life of the organism. 
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that it reflects, perpetuates, and creates.151 It then examines the function of dress 
through the lens of the sexual selection principles outlined above. 
Before discussing the cultural overlay of human dress, it is useful to briefly 
summarize the contours and extent of evolved sex dimorphism in humans. 
Humans are generally said to exhibit relatively little sexual dimorphism in 
physical appearance and size.152 Compared to our closest primate relatives, 
human males and females are very close in size and weight153 and do not show 
large differences in coloration or other physical features, as do gorillas, for 
example.154 Many evolutionary biologists conclude that “we are a ‘mildly 
polygynous’ species,” which means also “that we are a mostly monogamous 
species. Other than in strength we do not exhibit much physical dimorphism 
(we are monomorphic).”155 
 
 151. “Fashion and clothing are instrumental in the process of socialization into sexual and 
gender roles; they help shape peoples’ ideas of how men and women should look. It is not the case 
that fashion and clothing simply reflect an already existing sex and gender identity, but that they are 
‘part of the process by which attitudes to and images of both men and women are created and 
reproduced.’” BARNARD, supra note 14, at 111 (quoting E. ROUSE, UNDERSTANDING FASHION-89 108 
(Blackwell Science 1989)). 
 152. Dimorphism of the human brain, and in particular the existence of differences in average 
cognitive abilities between men and women, is a controversial topic and one that need not be 
addressed here. For representative sources on either side of the debate, see KINGSLEY R. BROWNE, 
BIOLOGY AT WORK 25–32 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2002); Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 
DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 988–89 (1992); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, 
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 52–56 (Yale Univ. Press & Russell Sage Foundation 1988); ANNE FAUSTO-
STERLING, SEXING THE BODY 3–5 (2000); CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 43–56 (Simon & 
Schuster 1992). 
 153. See MEALEY, supra note 107, at 264 (stating that human “[b]ody size dimorphism is small to 
moderate . . . (about 10% by height and about 20% by weight)” (alteration added)). It should be 
emphasized, however, that size is not a binary characteristic, and there is much overlap between the 
sexes. This statistic relates the difference in average size between males and females. Of course, some 
women are larger than many or even most men, and some men are smaller than many or even most 
women. 
 154. Gorillas are a “harem” species, in which a single silverback male (recognizable by the silver 
fur on his back) has exclusive reproductive access to all fertile females in the group. In contrast, 
chimpanzees live in large, multi-male troops and females mate often and with many males. See id. 
Among primates, the traits that vary the most depending upon the mating system of the particular 
species are body size, relative canine size, and relative testes size. As with body size, relative canine 
and testes sizes (relative to body weight of the male) in humans are consistent with the conclusion 
that humans are mostly monogamous. See id. at 263–64. 
 155. Id. at 317. Suppositions about the prevalent human mating pattern are presumed to be 
related to the extent and type of sex dimorphism based both on empirical observation and 
theoretical models of sexual selection. Empirically, monogamous species are generally 
monomorphic, exhibiting little sexual dimorphism. Theoretically, this would be predicted because 
monogamy should evolve under ecological and economic conditions wherein “the costs of desertion 
are too high (i.e. without the investment of a second parent, the offspring would likely not otherwise 
survive) or when the benefits of desertion are too low (i.e. other mating opportunities are unlikely).” 
MEALEY, supra note 107, at 156 (citing numerous scientific sources). Under such conditions, “both 
sexes should be circumspect in choice of partner, looking not only for ‘good genes’ and 
immunocompetence, but indications that the prospective partner will not desert the family unit as 
well.” Id. Thus, in monogamous species, “both sexes exercise choice in mateships, relying on mutual 
displays of vigor and commitment.” Id. Because the sexual selection pressures are similar upon both 
the male and the female, the species is monomorphic. 
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But if our unadorned bodies are relatively monomorphic, our adorned 
bodies are frequently much less so. Humans are creative and diverse in the ways 
that we modify our bodies, and in the ways that we do so in a gender-specific156 
manner. Humans begin with a body and then, like the male bowerbirds of 
Australia, proceed to build an elaborate construct on and around that body. 
Because humans are a highly social species,157 the construction of that dressed 
body takes place within an elaborate fabric of social norms and expectations. It 
has also been said that humans are a profoundly symbolic species in that humans 
in all societies invest objects and happenings with meaning beyond their most 
obvious or mundane functions.158 As such, it should come as little surprise that 
dress serves much more than the simple functions of warmth or protection from 
the elements. Scholars of dress uniformly assume, to a greater or lesser degree, 
that dress is a communicative social behavior.159 Among many social messages 
that dress communicates, sex and gender are especially salient.160 “All cultures 
will use clothing, if not fashion, to distinguish male from female, most will use it 
to mark the difference between secular and religious classes, and some will use 
it to mark membership of different families.”161 Thus, it appears that gender 
distinction may be the most universal and salient characteristic marked by 
human dress.162 
 
 156. I use the word gender here, rather than sex, because dress norms in many cultures are not 
binary. 
 157. E.g., id. at 265. 
 158. See TERRANCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND 
THE BRAIN 436 (Norton 1997) (arguing that, because of brain evolution spurred by the development 
of the symbolic system of language, humans as a species “are not just a species that uses symbols . . . 
the symbolic urge has infected us, and now by virtue of the irresistible urge it has instilled in us to 
turn everything we encounter and everyone we meet into symbols . . . .”). 
 159. Some have gone so far as to argue that dress is itself a language, see LURIE, supra note 13; 
others view dress as highly analogous to language in many respects, see ROLAND BARTHES, THE 
LANGUAGE OF FASHION (Andy Stafford trans., Berg Publishers Eng. ed. 2005); BARNARD, supra note 
14 (This idea is inherent in the title of the book, Fashion as Communication.). 
 160. There has been much discussion in the legal, sociological, and feminist literature of the 
proper meanings of the terms sex and gender. See, e.g., JOHN MONEY & ANKE EHRHART, MAN & 
WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION OF DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION 
TO MATURITY (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1973) (distinguishing sex from gender); ANNE 
FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3–5 
(Basic Books New Ed. ed. 2000) (discussing the sex/gender dichotomy); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 182 (Yale Univ. Press 
1979) (discussing the dual meanings of the word sex “to refer both to gender status (as in ‘the female 
sex’) and to the activity of intercourse (as in ‘to have sex’)”; Epstein, supra note 152 (arguing that “sex 
discrimination” as prohibited by Title VII is discrimination on the basis of physical sex, not gender; 
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the 
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1995) (arguing that “gender” is more 
appropriately used as an adjective, describing “masculine” or “feminine”). As discussed supra note 
35, I use the word “sex” to refer to biological maleness or femaleness, and “gender” to refer to social 
conventions regarding masculinity and femininity. In addition, note that the use of the word “sex” 
in the text accompanying this note conveys both meanings noted by Professor MacKinnon. 
 161. BARNARD, supra note 14, at 58. 
 162. An early writer stated that “[t]he great bifurcation of dress is sexual.” See Joanne B. Eicher, 
Dress, Gender and the Public Display of Skin, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 247 (quoting ERNEST 
CRAWLEY, DRESS, DRINKS, AND DRUMS (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1931)) (alteration added). 
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Three theories regarding the origin and function of dress were developed 
in the nineteenth century: the modesty theory, the protection theory, and the 
adornment theory.163 Contemporary theorists have elaborated upon these basic 
categories to suggest up to thirteen distinct possible functions of clothing: 
protection, modesty and concealment, immodesty and attraction, 
communication, individualistic expression, social worth or status, definition of 
social role, economic worth or status, political symbol, magico-religious 
condition, social rituals, and recreation.164 
As noted previously,165 protection is unlikely to have been the original 
impetus for human dress and “variation within cultures and between different 
cultures as to what constitutes protection caution against seeing protection as 
the prime function of clothing.”166 Furthermore, though history contains 
examples of distinctions in protective clothing based upon perceived biological 
differences between the sexes,167 it is unlikely that current gender-differentiated 
dress codes would or could be defended based upon such a rationale.168 
The second major category of dress function is encompassed by the 
modesty theory. “Until quite recently . . . it was almost universally agreed that 
the primal and fundamental reason for wearing clothes was modesty . . . . For 
those who accepted the literal truth of the Genesis story, there was no question 
about it.”169 Inherent in this theory is “the idea that certain body parts are 
indecent or shameful and should be covered so that they cannot be seen.”170 
However, there is a mirror image to the modesty story: attraction or seduction. 
Another theory of the origin and function of dress suggests that “the motive for 
wearing clothes is precisely immodesty or exhibitionism,” and that the purpose 
 
 163. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20; BARNARD, supra note 14, at 48. 
 164. See id. at 48–67. 
 165. See supra note 10. 
 166. BARNARD, supra note 14, at 50. Notwithstanding this apparent consensus on the part of dress 
theorists, some clothing quite obviously serves a protective function. In addition, when the concept 
of protection is expanded to encompass spiritual, religious, or magical beliefs, then many dress items 
such as amulets and good luck charms that are worn to ward off evil or to bring the wearer luck 
might be said to fall under the function of protection. See J.C. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOTHES 
71 (The Hogarth Press Ltd. 1930). Rubinstein classifies such items of dress under the category of 
adornment. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29–33 (noting that some items that today are considered 
adornment originated as “amulets believed to help the wearer master fears and anxieties relating to 
the supernatural world as well as those relating to the natural world, such as natural disasters, 
darkness, illness, and death”). 
 167. A highly ironic example was the corset of the early Victorian era, which was thought 
medically necessary but actually caused significant physical harm to its wearers. “Ladies’ ‘frames,’ it 
was believed, were extremely delicate; their muscles could not hold them up without assistance.” 
LURIE, supra note 13, at 217. 
 168. Cf. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that employer’s 
policy that prohibited fertile women from working in certain factory jobs that might expose potential 
offspring to lead constituted impermissible sex discrimination). 
 169. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting JAMES LAVER, MODESTY IN DRESS 9–11 (Heinemann 
1969)). 
 170. BARNARD, supra note 14, at 51. 
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of clothing is “to attract attention to the body rather than to deflect or repel that 
attention.”171 
Social norms regarding both the modesty and seduction functions of dress 
are and have historically been highly gender-stratified and thus are of particular 
interest here. With respect to modesty, though the religious exhortation to mask 
the signs of sexuality originally applied only to men,172 over time it came to be 
applied to women as well. Eventually, as with fundamentalist Islam and 
Orthodox Judaism, some religiously-based rules required women to remain 
almost completely covered from head to foot. The injunction that women cover 
their bodies was based on women’s “ability to seduce,” which “would lead men 
to stray from the spiritual.”173 
In addition to highly sex-specific expectations concerning how much—and 
which—skin may appropriately be revealed in public,174 the term “modesty” 
itself carries different substantive connotations based on the sex of the 
individual to which it is applied. For women in societies in which gendered 
expectations require them to cover certain body parts so as not to appear 
seductive to men, “modesty entails concealing the body and denying sexual 
allure, encouraging sexual inhibition.” In contrast, “[m]en offend modesty by 
‘swagger,’ an attempt at self-aggrandizement.”175 Applied to men, the concept of 
modesty strongly implies self-restraint. In the religious context, such male self-
restraint entailed a denial of worldly passions and devotion to the Church and 
to God. Applied to women, the concept of modesty implied self-restraint of a 
different sort: refraining from exposure of the body or suggestion of its 
seductive nature.176 
The virtue of self-restraint in men gained particular traction in the United 
States during the second half of the nineteenth century.177 In terms of fashion, 
this was a turning point after which “many well-to-do men rejected the 
sumptuous, body-hugging style, the velvet coat, breeches, perfume, and lace, 
and adopted a matched suit consisting of a coat, waistcoat, and trousers.”178 Male 
“gentlemen’s clothing” in England by the end of the nineteenth century “was 
designed to represent mastery over one’s feelings and to demonstrate 
rationality, the state of making decisions on the basis of calculation, 
 
 171. Id. at 53; see also RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 135–68 (discussing historic and contemporary 
“seductive images” in dress). Ironically, research has shown that covering parts of the body tends to 
eroticize those areas. It may be that in cultures in which body covering is not practiced, this 
supposed “danger” of the female body to seduce is lessened. See LURIE, supra note 13, at 212–14. 
 172. This was because, according to Saint Augustine, only in men are the signs of sexual arousal 
physically manifested in an obvious way. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 21. 
 173. Id. 
 174. There is enormous variation among different cultures regarding this social norm, and in 
some there is no such requirement for women to cover certain body parts. See id. at 20–22. 
 175. Id. at 22. 
 176. See LAVER, supra note 169. 
 177. “The doctrine of self-restraint [for men] was espoused from the pulpit, in the medical press, 
and on the lecture circuit. Writers of advice manuals suggested that, in controlling sexual desires, a 
man’s energy would be harnessed to productive activity.” Id. at 160 (citations omitted). 
 178. Id. at 159. 
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organization, abstract rules, and procedures.”179 This style became the prototype 
for the modern navy or charcoal gray business suit,180 which is widely viewed as 
projecting this image of (male) self-restraint.181 
A related theme that is represented by the dark-colored business suit—and 
also mirrored in both the evolutionary literature182 and the gender performance 
literature183—concerns the tension between individuality and social conformity. 
“Dress serves as a sign that the individual belongs to a certain group, but 
simultaneously differentiates the same individual from all others: it includes 
and excludes.”184 Certain types and styles of clothing emphasize individuality, 
while others emphasize conformity. As one might imagine, the archetype of 
conformity-emphasizing clothing is the uniform, for which lack of individual 
identity is embodied in the very word that names the category of dress. This is 
most clearly seen in the prototypical male business suit, often described as a 
type of uniform.185 
Like the evolutionary explanation of fancy dress in animals, the scholarly 
analysis of human dress tends to center around the ideas of communication, 
control, hierarchy, status, and sex- and gender-signaling.186 Thus, this literature 
adds a layer of complexity that is largely consistent with the ways in which 
many biologists view the functions of animal dress. In the next Part, I turn to the 
question of what lessons and insights might flow from the foregoing biological 
and sociological analysis of nonhuman and human dress. 
 
 179. Id. at 45. 
 180. See id. 
 181. There are echoes of this theme in the law and economics literature on signaling. For 
example, Eric Posner’s recent work relies heavily on an understanding of signaling cooperation and 
self-control (what he calls “discount rate”). See generally ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
(Harvard Univ. Press New Ed. ed. 2002). If an important role of signaling is to allow people correctly 
to distinguish cooperators from cheaters so as to decide with whom to cooperate, then the important 
trait that must be signaled is self-restraint—i.e., that one “care[s] about future games relative to 
present gains” and is willing to forego short-term gains from selfish behavior in order to reap the 
long-term rewards of cooperative behavior. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in 
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (1998). Because this type of signaling would be important in a 
business context, the understanding of the male business suit as a symbol (signal) of self-restraint 
converges interestingly with Posner’s theory. 
 182. For example, some biologists view distinctive coloration and ornament in animals as a 
signal of conspecificity (animals of the same species) and therefore as a means of avoiding mating 
with non-specifics (animals of other species). See CRONIN, supra note 103, at 129–31. 
 183. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS xi (Random 
House 2006) (“I recognize the value of assimilation, which is often necessary to fluid social 
interaction, to peaceful coexistence, and even to the dialogue through which difference is valued. For 
that reason, this is no simply screed against conformity. What I urge here is that we approach the 
renaissance of assimilation in this country critically.”). 
 184. DRESS AND GENDER, supra note 4, at 1. 
 185. Dissenting from a decision invalidating an employee dress code that required women in 
certain positions to wear uniforms but allowed men to wear “business attire,” a Seventh Circuit 
judge argued that the majority opinion “ignore[d] the fact of life that men’s customary business 
attire has never really advanced beyond the status of being a uniform.” Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1034 (7th Cir. 1979) (Pell, J., dissenting). 
 186. That is, signals both about sexual availability and modesty and about gender identity. 
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IV. IF THE SHOE FITS: SEXUAL SELECTION, SEX-BASED DRESS RULES, 
AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
The foregoing discussion reveals two predominant themes that emerge 
quite vividly in the sexual selection literature, the appearance code case law, and 
the sociological scholarship on human dress. The first theme concerns sexual 
attraction and mating behavior. As evolutionary theory and research reveal, 
differences in animal dress are, in the broadest sense, a result of sexual 
selection.187 This means that they are ultimately driven by sexual attraction and 
mating behavior. Likewise, a prominent strand of concern in the appearance 
code cases is whether a particular sex-specific requirement seems to be based on 
stereotypes about female sexual attractiveness. Finally, interdisciplinary 
scholarship on human fashion and dress demonstrates that among the primary 
functions of human dress are gender expression, modesty, and seduction. 
The second major theme that runs through all three categories of materials 
is that of status and power. The most highly ornamented males are found in 
species in which females have the greatest degree of sexual choice and power in 
the mating dance; that is, the degree of sexual dimorphism in animals is closely 
related to questions of status and power.188 In the case law involving workplace 
dress and grooming, courts have invalidated sex-differentiated uniform policies 
because of the perception that such rules signaled power and status differences 
that were not justified by the relative positions of the employees in question.189 
Similarly, scholarship on human dress has long revealed the role of clothing in 
creating, reflecting, and enforcing power and status differences.190 
 
 187. The quote from Charles Darwin in ORIGIN OF SPECIES, supra note 1, with which this Article 
began remains an accurate statement of the understanding of sexual selection and sex differences: 
“when the males and females of any animal have the same general habits of life, but differ in 
structure, colour, or ornament, such differences have been mainly caused by sexual selection.” 
 188. See MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 137 
(Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1st Am. Ed. ed. 1994) (“Where males gather on communal display arenas, a 
male’s success owes more to his ability to dance and strut than to his ability to fight other males”) 
(citing J. Hoglund & J.G.M. Robertson, Female Preferences, Male Decision Rules and the Evolution of Leks 
in the Great Snipe, Gallinago Media, 40 ANIMAL BEHAV. 15 (1990)); EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: 
THE NEW SYNTHESIS 331–32 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (“The most complicated 
and spectacular lek systems occur in birds,” and “[t]he males belonging to species on this list [of ten 
families of lekking species of birds] are among the most colorful of the bird world. The brilliant red 
cock of the rock, for example, is easily the most spectacular cotingid, and the birds of paradise are 
justly considered the most beautiful of all birds.” (alterations added)). 
 189. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1028 (majority opinion); O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory 
Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987); EEOC v. Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 
WL 152 (E.D. Mo. 1981). 
 190. See, e.g., Entwistle & Wilson, Introduction: Body Dressing, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 4 
(“[D]ress and fashion mark out particular kinds of bodies, drawing distinctions in terms of class and 
status, gender, age, sub-cultural affiliations that would otherwise not be so visible or significant.” 
(alteration added)); Kate Soper, Dress Needs: Reflections on the Clothed Body, Selfhood and Consumption, 
in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 21 (“Nor should we forget the extent to which restrictions on 
human dress are used to distinguish and police social and sexual hierarchies . . . one , very insidious, 
way of exercising power over others is by means of control over their mode of dress”); RUBINSTEIN, 
supra note 4, at 69–99 (discussing the images of power and of authority reflected and reinforced by 
certain modes of dress); LURIE, supra note 13, at 115–53 (discussing the role of clothing in reflecting 
status). 
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In this Part, I argue that these intuitive concerns on the part of courts are 
valid and that an examination of animal dress differences supports the 
importance of these two major rhetorical strands in the case law. Indeed, the 
biological literature suggests that these two themes might actually be two sides 
of the same coin, an insight which has important implications when considering 
employer policies that mandate female ornamentation. While sexual 
attractiveness and status signals are not the only relevant considerations, at the 
very least those employer grooming codes that reflect stereotypes either of 
attractiveness and sexuality or of power and status should be viewed as sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.191 Furthermore, the animal dress analogy 
suggests that the categories of dress codes that implicate these two concerns are 
much broader than courts have usually found. Thus, for example, under the 
analysis presented here the makeup requirement in Jespersen should be 
invalidated. 
Furthermore, the sexual selection literature teaches that sex differences in 
appearance are anything but trivial. Though courts and employers tend to view 
clothing, makeup, and hair rules as de minimus,192 both sexual selection theory 
and the interdisciplinary work on human dress demonstrate not only that sex 
dimorphisms are shaped by—and in turn shape—relations between the sexes 
but also that the implication of frivolity itself reflects a negative gender-linked 
stereotype. 
A. Sexual Dimorphism, Dress, and the Triviality Question 
Addressing first the latter point, social science and humanities scholarship 
on human dress teaches that dress is anything but insignificant, both on an 
individual and a cultural level.193 Likewise, evolutionary biology makes clear 
 
 191. Thus, the analysis here is silent about the treatment of transgendered individuals, 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the hair length rules as applied to male employees. 
It may well be (and I would argue) that the sex-based differential treatment and sex stereotyping 
evidenced by the employer practices in those contexts constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII. 
See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination, 
81 GEO. L. J. 1 (1992). My claim here is more specific and more modest. 
 192. See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
(summarizing federal appellate case law on hair length policies and stating that a major rationale 
supporting the decisions is “that such employment policies have only a de minimus effect”); Knott v. 
Mo. Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that where employer-mandated 
appearance rules “are reasonable and are imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees, 
slight differences in the appearance requirements for males and females have only a negligible effect 
on employment opportunities”); Boyce v. Gen. Ry. Signal Co., 2004 WL 1574023 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“[E]very . . . federal court of appeals that has considered the issue of male hair-length policies has 
upheld such policy, finding either that the policy did not conflict with the statutory goal of equal 
employment or that it had only a de minimus effect on employment opportunities.”); Matter of 
Gladstone (Catherwood), 36 A.D. 2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 3d Dept. 1971), aff’d, 30 N.Y. 2d 576 (1972) (“The 
employer did not have to change the rules to conform to the particular whim of this claimant, and a 
failure to do so did not violate his rights to privacy and free expression.”). See also Bartlett, supra note 
34, at 2556–57. 
 193. See generally RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4; LURIE, supra note 13; BARTHES, supra note 159, at 7 
(describing dress as a “system [that] is essentially defined by normative links which justify, oblige, 
prohibit, tolerate, in a word control the arrangement of garments on a concrete wearer who is 
identified in their social and historical place: it is a value” (alteration added)). 
14__SEAMAN.DOC 2/8/2007 2:08 PM 
460 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:423 2007 
that sexual dimorphisms in coloration and ornament come about mainly 
through sexual selection, and that such features play an enormous role in animal 
behavior and social systems.194 Yet many courts continue to treat clothing, hair, 
and makeup as if they are trivial.195 Such treatment mirrors the cultural 
stereotype that interests in fashion and appearance are superficial and non-
serious, and that these are mainly female concerns.196 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
in Carroll viewed the employer’s argument that uniforms were necessary to 
prevent women from indulging in fashion excesses and competition to imply a 
demeaning sex-based stereotype.197 
Many recognize the importance of dress not only as a method of individual 
and cultural expression but also as a kind of language that triggers conscious 
and unconscious associations on the parts of both wearer and viewer.198 In Price 
Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was not passed over for promotion because she 
violated an explicit dress code.199 Insofar as dress played a role in the case, it was 
as a suggestion of what she might do to increase her chances of making partner 
the following year. As the partner charged with explaining to Hopkins why she 
had been passed over told her, she might fare better the next time around if only 
she would “dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry.”200 The Supreme Court took this as evidence that Hopkins was 
subjected to sex stereotyping and that the adverse employment action was 
because of her sex and not, as the employer argued, based on a gender-neutral 
standard requiring good interpersonal skills.201 As the Court wryly noted, it does 
not require expertise in psychology “to know that, if an employee’s flawed 
‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of 
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has 
drawn the criticism.”202 
This is a very telling statement by the Court. The partner presumably gave 
Hopkins this advice because he understood on some level that dress is 
 
 194. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 195. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 192. 
 196. See Entwistle & Wilson, supra note 190, at 15 (describing philosophy’s “repudiation of the 
body as the intellectual form of its repudiation of the feminine,” and noting that “[t]his is a stance 
which also lends itself to a more general cultural process of gender stereotyping and masculine 
disassociation in Western culture, according to which it is women who are the vainer sex and the 
more concerned with what they wear while men are largely indifferent to questions of attire” 
(alteration added)). 
 197. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033 (“What is offensive is the compulsion to wear employer-
identified uniforms and the assumption on which the employer openly admits that rule is based: 
that women cannot be expected to exercise good judgment in choosing business apparel, whereas 
men can.”). 
 198. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4; LURIE, supra note 13; BARTHES, supra note 159; BARNARD, supra 
note 14; ANNE HOLLANDER, SEEING THROUGH CLOTHES (Univ. of Cal. Press Reprint ed. 1993); BODY 
DRESSING, supra note 3. 
 199. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 200. Id. at 235. 
 201. The defendant argued, and there was some evidence in the record tending to show, that 
Hopkins was somewhat lacking in this area. The Court viewed the evidence as sufficient to show 
that, whether she was “nice” or not, such a requirement was not equally imposed upon men being 
considered for partnership. See id. at 256. 
 202. Id. 
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relevant—in an empirical, rather than legal, sense—to the way in which an 
individual is viewed by others in a particular social context. He believed that if 
she presented an outward appearance of femininity, she might counter the 
negative impression among some partners of her “macho” behavior.203 The 
evolutionary and human dress literatures strongly bear out this intuition on the 
part of the Court and the Price Waterhouse partner; in addition, social 
psychology research demonstrates the very strong unconscious impact social 
categorization can have upon both self-assessment and assessment by others.204 
With respect to the scientific understanding of sex differences in dress in 
nonhuman animals, it is quite clear that these are not trivial or they would not 
have evolved. Male peacocks have the tails that they do because peahens, 
whatever their reasons, prefer to mate with males that have large, beautiful, 
colorful, magnificent tails. We might think that the peahens are silly for having 
such a preference, but this underestimates peahens in the extreme, and imposes 
human sex stereotypes upon them as well. Recent sexual selection research 
demonstrates empirically that the females’ preferences are neither silly nor 
arbitrary; rather, they tend to correlate with better reproductive outcomes.205 
Whether because feather coloration signals low parasite load, or because it 
otherwise signals male fitness, it is simply not a de minimus consideration in 
biological terms.206 In short, animals take notice of dress differences and mold 
their behaviors in response to them. 
Likewise, the interdisciplinary social science scholarship on human dress 
reveals that the ways humans in any culture clothe, adorn, and modify their 
bodies are anything but trivial.207 In the first place, both body adornment and 
gender differences in dress are, by all accounts, universal among human beings. 
Though there are vast differences across cultures in the manner and extent of 
dress and sex differences therein, human societies without exception do expect 
their members to dress and to do so in accordance with specific gender norms. 
Dress is understood to express or signal a panoply of social characteristics and 
behavioral traits—indeed many theorists view dress as akin to language, which 
many view as a (perhaps the) defining trait of the human species.208 “Being 
 
 203. Among other comments in her promotion file were statements that Hopkins was “macho,” 
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that she needed to “take ‘a course at charm 
school,’” and that she “ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to 
an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr [partner] candidate.” Id. at 235 
(alterations added). 
 204. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (finding that subjects 
construed the same actions differently depending on, for example, the race of the actor); Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (describing the psychological literature on 
“priming,” which demonstrates the clear impact of subconscious self-categorization upon individual 
performance). 
 205. See RIDLEY, supra note 188, at 146–59 (collecting and discussing studies demonstrating that 
the preferred males are also the fittest males by other measures, such as low parasite load, disease 
resistance, and offspring success). 
 206. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 207. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 208. See Entwistle & Wilson, supra note 190, at 2 (“A number of theorists [studying dress] saw the 
manner in which dress communicated as a kind of language. This may have been partly because it 
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clothed . . . is the mark of a distinctively human form of consciousness, of being 
a ‘person.’”209 
The idea that dress is trivial is closely tied to the association in 
contemporary Western culture of fashion with femininity. Dress is viewed, 
negatively, as a superficial, female concern.210 Thus, the notion that dress rules 
that facially differentiate on the basis of sex do not give rise to a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination is, ironically, an embodiment of exactly the negative sex 
stereotyping that the law otherwise condemns. The argument in the grooming 
cases based on immutability cannot do all of the work of explaining why sex-
based dress codes are treated differently than other types of facial 
discrimination.211 Rather, the notion in the case law seems to be that some 
combination of mutability and lack of importance is what grounds the 
articulation of a test that applies uniquely to dress codes.212 That notion is itself a 
reflection of demeaning gender stereotypes. Rather than avoid true analysis by 
insisting that enforced dress differences are de minimus, courts should recognize 
that dress matters and proceed to a genuine examination of whether they are a 
form of impermissible sex discrimination. 
B. Wolves, Sheep, and Clothing: Sex, Power, and Dress 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, I will assume that dress is non-trivial 
and that employer mandated sex distinctions in dress are likewise deserving of 
actual analysis rather than ad hoc rules. Like the wolf in sheep’s clothing, dress 
rules appear benign but carry hidden dangers of unconscious discrimination 
and retrenchment of invidious gender stereotypes. The questions still remain: 
 
had become somewhat commonplace to assert the idea that fashion and dress are ubiquitous to 
culture, a fundamental feature which defines humanity.” (alteration added)). 
 209. Id. at 18 (quoting RENE DESCARTES, A DISCOURSE ON METHOD ETC. 92–93 (Dent 1924)). 
 210. See BARNARD, supra note 14 (explaining the theory of a “gender imbalance in the structures 
of looking,” such that males are assumed to be active and be the “looker,” while females are passive 
and are looked at such that “[t]he creation and maintenance of a look, or an appearance, becomes 
something like a defining feature of femininity, [which] may be a part of the sense behind the 
popular or traditional belief that fashion and clothing are somehow especially or properly the 
concern of women rather than of men.” (alterations added)); cf. Case, supra note 21 (arguing that the 
denigration of things considered “feminine” is at the root of much sex discrimination and that the 
law must therefore protect effeminate men from discrimination on the basis of their expression of 
femininity in order also to protect women against sex discrimination); BARNARD, supra note 14, at 2 
(noting idea that “for some people, to be fashion conscious or ‘fashionable’ is still deemed to make 
you ‘fickle,’ ‘shallow,’ ‘dumb,’ ‘ephemeral’ [and] ‘fascist’ . . . . In many everyday colloquialisms, 
fashion, clothing and textiles are associated with deceit and triviality.” (alteration added)). 
 211. Other traits that are arguably immutable (in the sense that they are not completely outside 
the individual’s control) are protected, for example religion and pregnancy. For an illuminating 
comparison of courts’ treatment of immutability in the race, sex, and religion contexts, see Karen 
Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title 
VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1997). 
 212. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (hair length is 
neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. 
Ind. 1998) (hair length is neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, 
Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003) (wearing ear stud implicates neither immutable characteristic nor 
fundamental right). 
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What should the rules look like and what insight can the study of sexual 
selection and animal dress differences provide in answering that question? 
In comparing animal and human dress, one intriguing difference presents 
itself at the outset: when sexual dimorphism is present in animals, it is nearly 
always the male that is the more decorated of the two sexes. In contrast, in 
modern Western human societies the relative decoration of the sexes is exactly 
the reverse.213 An examination of the evolutionary pressures that result in sexual 
dimorphisms in animals suggests some reasons why this anomaly might exist 
and also helps answer the question what the legal standard should look like for 
eliminating barriers to equal employment opportunity for women.214 
As explained in Part IIIA, sex dimorphisms in color, decoration, and 
ornamentation are caused mainly by sexual selection and, in particular, 
intersexual selection. That is, the primary way that male animals acquire the 
fancy dress that is exemplified by the peacock’s tail is through female preference 
to mate with males exhibiting the trait.215 The very best-dressed, fanciest males 
are those that are members of what are known as “lekking” species.216 “A lek is a 
place where males gather in the breeding season, mark out little territories that 
are clustered together, and parade their wares for visiting females.”217 In these 
species, the female exercises a rare degree of reproductive choice. A description 
by a well-known science writer of the sage grouse lek provides a striking 
illustration: 
 
 213. Though there have been eras and places in which human males have been highly adorned, 
the current pattern has generally prevailed in the West since the end of the French Revolution. See 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 49–50 (relating that “[a]fter the French Revolution, scions of aristocratic 
families in France and England were ridiculed for constructing highly elaborate sartorial 
expressions,” that in the 1880’s “[m]en who looked beautiful continued to be denigrated as not being 
men,” and that in the U.S. “at least since the beginning of the twentieth century, goal-directed 
behavior has been the standard in industrial production” with the concomitant move toward the 
dark, somber-colored business suit as the epitome of male status dress). On the other hand, clothing 
regulations from medieval times presents an almost exact mirror image of the male-female pattern in 
lekking species. These regulations “recognized that to attract a husband women had to wear more 
frivolous attire than at other times. Women in the courting stage were allowed to make use of color 
and ornament different from what a wife could use.” Id. at 112; see also id. at 123–25. 
 214. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (“The objective of Congress 
in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of . . . employees over other employees.”) (alteration in original); Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (“Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their 
sex.”). 
 215. This is in contrast to dimorphisms involving size and weaponry, which are more often 
caused by intrasexual selection, or competition between males. One author describes the peacock 
thus: “Peacocks are among the few birds that run a kind of market in seduction techniques, called a 
“lek” after the Swedish word for play.” RIDLEY, supra note 188, at 140–41. 
 216. See WILSON, supra note 188, at 331–32. As Wilson notes, “[t]he most complicated and 
spectacular lek systems occur in birds,” and “[t]he males belonging to species on this list [of ten 
families of lekking species of birds] are among the most colorful of the bird world. The brilliant red 
cock of the rock, for example, is easily the most spectacular cotingid, and the birds of paradise are 
justly considered the most beautiful of all birds.” Id. (alterations added). 
 217. RIDLEY, supra note 188, at 141. 
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It is an extraordinary experience to drive out to the middle of Wyoming before 
dawn, stop the car on a featureless plain that looks like every other one, and see 
it come alive with dancing grouse. Each knows his place; each runs through his 
routine of inflating the air sacs in his breast and strutting forward, bouncing the 
fleshy sacs through his feathers for all the world like a dancer at the Folies 
Bergere. The females wander through this market, and after several days of 
contemplating the goods on offer, they mate with one of the males. That they are 
choosing, not being forced to choose, seems obvious: The male does not mount 
the female until she squats in front of him.218 
The correlation between fancy dress and female choice is that the males 
must entice the females to choose them or lose out in the contest for 
reproductive success. In lekking species, a small number of males do most of the 
mating and the rest of the males go home empty-handed, so to speak. This 
dynamic creates selection pressures for showy displays of the sort that the 
females prefer. The females, in this sense, are possessed of a good deal of 
reproductive choice and a certain degree of power and autonomy.219 The males, 
conversely, are looking to be chosen. 
For humans, in contrast, the contemporary Western norm posits that 
females should be the showy sex. They are expected to wear more colorful 
clothing than men, to color their faces with makeup, and to display certain body 
parts. Just as this is a reversal of the dress dimorphism pattern among 
nonhuman animal species, so might we hypothesize that it is a reversal of the 
power dimorphism as well. In other words: the prevalent gender based norm 
that requires women to be the fancier sex is likely to reveal a power differential 
that is both reflected and perpetuated by such a gender dress norm. Such a 
norm, then, is neither trivial nor benign. 
Courts already evidence a suspicion of dress codes that seem to mandate 
female sexiness.220 The animal dress research suggests that this suspicion is not 
only well grounded, but that it does not go far enough. Not just blatantly 
sexually provocative attire, but any dress policy that requires women employees 
to be more colorful, more decorated, or to show more of their bodies should 
raise an inference that the policy is discriminatory on the basis of sex. 
Likewise, courts have struck down as discriminatory uniform requirements 
that seemed to imply a power or status differential between male and female 
 
 218. Id. The picture is not all freedom and play for the female, however: “Minutes later his job is 
done, and her long and lonely parenthood is beginning. She has received only one thing from her 
mate—genes—and it looks as if she has tried hard to get the best there were to be had.” Id. 
 219. Sexual coercion is not seen in lekking species as it is often seen in other species, including 
those in which the males are significantly larger than the females or in which the dimorphisms are 
otherwise the result of intrasexual (male-male) selection. For discussions of sexual coercion among 
animals, see Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts, Male Aggression and Sexual Coercion of Females in 
Nonhuman Primates and Other Mammals: Evidence and Theoretical Implications, 22 ADVANCES STUDY 
BEHAV. 1–63 (1993); T.H. Clutton-Brock & G. Parker, Punishment in Animal Societies, 373 NATURE 209 
(1995). 
 220. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 
692 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1982); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 774 (D.D.C. 1973). See 
also discussion supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
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employees.221 Viewed through the prism of sexual selection, power and 
decoration are closely related. Forcing women to wear makeup and reveal their 
legs, as much as forcing them to wear a uniform when males in similar positions 
do not, implies that they are objects of selection rather than agents of choice and 
authority. 
Several scholars have in recent years turned their focus to the problems of 
unconscious discrimination and cognitive biases.222 Dress, as the aspect of 
individuals that others see first and see most clearly, cannot but be a part of any 
assessment of the individual employee, just as the peahen cannot but be 
influenced by the size, brightness, and symmetry of the peacock’s tail. Because 
dress is so crucial a characteristic in sexually dimorphic species, and because it is 
so closely tied to sexual attractiveness, choice, and power dynamics, employers 
should be prohibited from requiring women to dress in gender normative ways 
that reflect those traits even if they believe that such dress codes do not amount 
to intentional sex stereotyping.223 Where, as here, so many threads come together 
to demonstrate that sex differences in dress are likely to affect the way that 
individuals are treated by others, employers should not be permitted to 
mandate differences that implicate notions of attractiveness or power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
People are not peafowl, and yet an examination of sex-based dress norms 
cannot but evoke the image of the peacock strutting his stuff or the male sage 
grouse shimmying his breast like a burlesque dancer.224 Nor can it fail to 
illuminate the contrast between the plain females in such animal species and the 
modern Western dress norms that cast males as drab and colorless and females 
as fancy. Such dress differences among animals are caused by sexual selection 
and, in that sense, are most certainly “because of . . . sex.”225 More significant, the 
extent and nature of these dress dimorphisms among nonhuman animals reflect 
male-female power dynamics and are closely related to sexual attractiveness 
and mating behavior. Indeed, sexual behavior and power dynamics are two 
sides of the same coin and cannot logically be separated in the context of animal 
dress: males are fancier precisely because females have more power. 
Courts in the workplace dress cases have already exhibited some sensitivity 
to the factors of sexuality and power status where women have challenged sex-
differentiated dress requirements, though they have not explicitly related these 
two concerns nor applied them in any systematic way. An examination of the 
 
 221. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979); 
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987); EEOC v. 
Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 WL 152 (E.D. Mo. 1981). 
 222. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Krieger, supra note 204; Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La 
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000); Amy 
L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L. J. 1129 (1999). 
 223. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(finding no evidence that Harrah’s intended to enforce a sex stereotype). 
 224. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 225. Title VII imposes this requirement as a basis for a finding of sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(2) (2000). 
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sexual selection literature reveals that all dress dimorphisms are essentially and 
inextricably entwined with the elements of sexuality and power. The fancier the 
dress, the more power exercised by the undecorated sex. When viewed in that 
light, it becomes impermissible—indeed inexcusable—for employers to 
mandate, and for courts to validate, dress and grooming differences that reflect 
social gender norms of attractiveness and decoration.226 
 
 226. I do not address here the problem of sex related businesses such as the late Playboy Club or 
strip clubs. In a sense, those cases involve not sex-differentiated dress codes but sex-based hiring 
pure and simple (though of course, once hired, female employees are required to dress in a highly 
sexualized manner). Thus, the issue is distinct and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
